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ESTABLISHING UNIFORMITY IN HIV-FEAR
CASES: A MODIFICATION OF THE DISTINCT
EVENT APPROACH
But we can't seem to make AIDS go away, either through
mental gymnastics or the magic of science.
And then there is death.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In June of 1988, Bessie Carroll visited her terminally ill sister in the
hospital. 2 After applying lotion on her sister's skin, Bessie rinsed her hands in
the sink and then reached for a paper towel* from what appeared to be a paper
towel dispenser next to the sink.' Instead of a paper towel dispenser, the
container was an unmarked contaminated needle receptacle, and Bessie was
pricked by three needles.4 Thus began Bessie's nightmare that she had possibly
been exposed to Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) 5 or Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), the virus believed to cause AIDS, 6 from the
1. Harlon Dalton, Preface, AIDS AND THE LAW: A GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC (Harlon L. Dalton
et al. eds., 1987), reprinted in AIDS LAW TODAY at xii, xiv (Scott Burris et al. eds., 1993).
2. Carroll v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Servs., Inc., 868 S.W.2d 585, 586 (Tenn. 1993).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. In 1981, a publication by the Center for Disease Control (CDC) officially recognized
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) as a fatal blood-borne disease. The disease causes
a distinct reduction in the body's infection fighting system by destroying white blood cells. Stephen
A. Skiver & James Hickey, AIDS: Legal Issues 1992, 19 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 839, 839 (1993).
Because of the collapse of the body's immune system through a reduction in white blood cells, AIDS
patients fall prey to common diseases that would ordinarily not be fatal. Jon Cohen, What Causes
the Immune System Collapse Seen in AIDS? AIDS: The Unanswered Questions, ScI., May 28,
1993, at 1256.
6. Garry G. Mathiason & Steven B. Berlin, AIDS in the Healthcare, Business, and
Governmental Workplace, ALI-ABA, June 3, 1993, at 637. HIV is believed to be the cause of
AIDS by the CDC and other organizations. HIV gradually depletes the number of T-Lymphocyte
cells without which the body's immune system cannot function. Therefore, HIV increasingly leaves
the infected individual more susceptible to infection. Sidney D. Watson, Eliminating Fear Through
Comparative Risk: Docs, AIDS, and the Anti-Discrimination Ideal, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 739, 746
(1992).
It is well established that one of four bodily fluids is needed to transmit HIV: human blood,
semen (including pre-ejaculatory fluid), vaginal secretions, or breast milk. NICK SIANO, No TIME
TO WAIT 33 (1993). Siano asserts that urine, feces, or sweat cannot readily transmit the virus, but
it is important to recognize that urine and feces can contain blood that could transmit HIV. Id.
The only documented modes of HIV transmission are: (1) sexual intercourse with
an HIV infected person; (2) sharing needles contaminated with blood infected with the
virus; (3) parenteral, mucous membrane, or non-intact skin contact with HIV-infected
1251
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needles.
7
Although Bessie was tested for HIV on six different occasions, and all of
the tests were negative, she experienced profound fear and anguish during the
period in which she did not know with medical certainty whether she was
infected with HIV.' Bessie's fear was legitimate, given the rapid spread of HIV
blood; f4) transfusion of HIV-infected blood; (5) mother-to-child transmission during
pregnancy, delivery, and breast feeding; and (6) transplants of HIV infected organs and
tissues.
Watson, supra, at 751.
Transmission does not occur through saliva, tears, or casual contact such as hugging, kissing,
sneezing, or from toilet seats. William L. Earl & Judith Kavanaugh, Meeting the AIDS Epidemic
in the Courtroom: Practical Suggestions in Litigating Your First AIDS Case, 12 NovA L. REV.
1203, 1206 (1988). However, in early December 1993, two cases involving household items
threatened to undermine researchers' beliefs as to how the virus is transmitted. In New Jersey, two
young girls were living in the same foster home and, although both of their mothers were HIV-
infected, only the older girl was HIV positive since birth. It was discovered about eighteen months
before the report was published that the younger girl was infected with HIV and the virus in her
blood matched that of the older girl. The case threatened to undermine the belief that social contact
cannot transmit the virus. However, it soon became apparent that the infection had not occurred
from a new hazard but from a risk that is preventable and already known: blood passed between
the two girls. The older girl frequently had nosebleeds and the younger girl had open lesions on her
arms from dermatitis. Also, the two girls sometimes shared a toothbrush despite the older girl's
bleeding gums and, consequently, HIV-infected blood was passed to the younger girl who may have
had an open cut in her mouth. Therefore, the transfer agent was blood. Geoffrey Cowley, AIDS
Without Needles or Sex, NEwsWEEK, Dec. 29, 1993, at 106.
A second case occurred in teenage hemophiliac brothers. The older brother tested HIV
positive in 1985 when he received a contaminated blood transfusion, but the younger brother was
HIV negative until 1993 when it was discovered that he was infected with a viral strain of HIV that
matched his brother's viral strain. The brothers never shared needles and never had sex together,
but they did share a razor blade that may have cut both in quick succession. Therefore, both cases
were the result of blood to blood exposure which has been established since the beginning of the
HIV epidemic as a transmitter of HIV. Id; See also David Gates, An American Tragedy in Iowa,
NEwSWEEK, Feb. 7, 1994, at 44 (chronicling a family of hemophiliacs in which seven members have
died from AIDS and an eighth is HIV positive as the result of receiving contaminated blood
products).
Although the majority of medical researchers attribute the cause of AIDS to HIV, some
researchers believe that there are other causes of AIDS. ROBERT S. ROOT-BERNSTEIN, RETHINKING
AIDS-THE TRAGIC COST OF PREMATURE CONSENSUS 1 (1993). Root-Bernstein argues that
medical researchers have committed grave errors and contributed to the increasing number of deaths
from AIDS by clinging to the idea that HI is the sole cause of AIDS merely because of the high
correlation between HIV and AIDS. Id. at 1, 329. Because there have been some AIDS cases
where the victim was never infected with HIV, Root-Bernstein argues that there must be other causes
of AIDS in addition to HI. Id. at 28-30, 334. Instead, he argues that there must be co-factors
such as other viruses, bacterium, and drugs. Id; See also JON RAPPOPORT, AIDS INC.: SCANDAL
OF THE CENTURY 333 (1988) (arguing that there is "no proof that AIDS is a single disease-entity
or a syndrome caused by one agent"); JAD ADAMS, AIDS: THE HI MYTH (1989) (arguing that
HIV is not the sole cause of AIDS).
7. Carroll v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Servs., Inc., 868 S.W.2d 585, 586 (Tenn. 1993).
8. Id.
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and AIDS, 9 and the uncertainty that surrounds these diseases.'°
The more the scientific community learns about AIDS and HIV, the less
certain it becomes about all aspects of the disease." Added to this uncertainty
are conflicting opinions by some researchers that HIV does not cause AIDS"
and skepticism about the tests that are supposed to predict whether an individual
has been infected with HIV.'3 A lack of uniformity also exists on a variety of
9. The fear of AIDS is real because, in the United States, by January 1, 1993, AIDS had caused
171,800 deaths, there were 253,448 reported cases of AIDS, and approximately 1.5 million other
people were infected with HIV. Mathiason & Berlin, supra note 6, at 637. Since the mid-1970s,
more than 17 million people (the majority in Africa) have contracted HIV. Geoffrey Cowley, The
Ever Expanding Plague: AIDS Experts Point to Asia as the Next Epicenter, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 22,
1994, at 37. Experts also claim that over 40 million people will be infected with HIV by the year
2000. Id.
10. See infra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
11. In 1993, Science magazine surveyed the world's leading AIDS researchers about their
search for a vaccine or a cure for AIDS. The common response among the researchers was that the
more knowledge they accumulate about the disease, the faster the assumptions that seemed intact a
year ago become obsolete. John Benditt, AIDS-The Unanswered Questions, Scl., May 28, 1993,
at 1253. Recently, researchers discarded several accepted certainties. For example, the theory that
almost all of the damage is caused by HIV's direct killing of cells collapsed in the face of a new
theory that indirect mechanisms are also involved. Jon Cohen, AIDS Research: The Mood is
Uncertain, Sd., May 28, 1993, at 1254. In the area of treatment, researchers once considered the
drug AZT helpful for infected patients who had not begun to show AIDS symptoms, but recently
have abandoned this belief because of new data that the drug is of little help to those patients. Id.
The limits of AZT are not new discoveries, because in people with AIDS, AZT only prevents death
for possibly one year and does not cure AIDS. Id. For many researchers, the data simply
reinforces the belief that "no drug is going to knock out HIV by itself." Id. at 1255.
12. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. Chaos and controversy appear to have
transcended their existence in HIV/AIDS research and prevention to the legal system where courts
have responded to HIV litigation with confusion and diverse approaches. Roger N. Braden, AIDS:
Dealing with the Plague, 19 N. KY. L. REv. 277, 278 nn.6-7 (1992). Braden's article explores the
various dilemmas that the HIV crisis presents to the courts and how courts respond to tort actions
for sexual transmission of HIV/AIDS and discrimination against HIV/AIDS victims. Id. at 281-331.
The overriding theme of Braden's work is that as the number of HIV transmission cases filed
continues to increase, uniformity is needed among the states to combat this crisis. Id. at 331-32.
Braden's solution is to create federal programs to help society deal more effectively with AIDS. Id.
13. Eleni Papadopulos-Eleopulos et al., Is a Positive Western Blot Proof of HIV Infection,
BO/TfCH., June 1993, at 696. The two methods used to test for the presence of HIV are enzyme-
linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) and Western Blot (WB) antibody tests. Id. Currently, there
is general acceptance that a positive WB antibody test is equivalent with HIV infection because WB
is believed to be a highly sensitive test. However, there is evidence which indicates that the
antibody tests are:
(1) not standardized, (2) not reproducible, (3) possibly not specific, because the WB
proteins (bands) which are considered to be encoded by the HIV genome and to be
specific to HIV may not be encoded by the HIV genome and may in fact represent
normal cellular proteins, and (4) not absolute, because no "gold standard" exists (the
gold standard here would be H1V itselt). Therefore, a positive WB may represent
nothing more than cross-reactivity with non-HIV antibodies present in AIDS patients and
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issues such as condom advertising, 4 mandatory testing of health care
workers," restriction of HIV positive health care workers, 6 disclosure of
those at risk.
Id.
The evaluation of this problem is extremely technical, and complex and beyond the scope of
this note, but the main point is that the test for HIV infection needs to be reevaluated because it may
not be accurate. Id. One of the frightening aspects of this evidence is that there is no
standardization among the laboratories who administer WB tests as to what constitutes a positive test.
Therefore, the test results may depend on which lab evaluated the blood, because the labs have
different criteria in determining what constitutes a negative or positive result. Id. at 697-98.
14. One of the greatest public policy debates has been over the advertisement of condoms.
Malcolm Gladwell, A Mauer of Condom Sense; Rejection of Erplicit Ads Angers AIDS Educators,
WASH. PoST, Api. 9, 1992, at Cl. In 1991, federal health officials proposed a series of
advertisements that promoted condoms for the practice of safe sex, but the head of the Center for
Disease Control terminated these ads because he felt that they were too explicit. Id. As a result,
the government's $1.5 million "America Responds to AIDS" campaign could not mention the words
"condom" or "sex." Id.
This decision was changed in 1993, and a new set of public service ads have emerged that do
use the words "condom" and "sex." Jonathan Alter, 7he Power to Change What's 'Cool,'
NEWSwvEK, Jan. 17, 1994, at 23. The ads are the subject of ridicule by many but, "the problem
with all the snickering is not just that 200,000 Americans have already died of AIDS, but that unlike
so many government programs, these ads-which also preach abstinence-may actually save lives."
Id.
15. See Donald J. McNeil & Laurie A. Spieler, Mandatory Testing of Hospital Employees
Exposed to the AIDS Virus: Need to Know or Unwarranted Invasion of Privacy?, 21 LOY. U. CHI.
L. J. 1039, 1073 (1990) (reasoning that hospital employees who refuse to submit to HIV testing that
is accompanied by appropriate guarantees of confidentiality and accommodation can be fired and that
such firing will not violate either constitutional or statutory provisions, unless the state expressly
prohibits such testing); Michael L. Closen, A Call for Mandatory HIV Testing and Restriction of
Certain Health Care Professionals, 9 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REv. 421, 434-38 (1990) (proposing
mandatory HIV testing of health care professionals who engage in physically invasive contact with
patients which is contact involving the risk of blood transmission from the health care professional
to the patient). But see Scott H. Isaacman, The Other Side of the Coin: HIV-Infected Health Care
Workers, 9 ST. LOUIS U. PuB. L. REv. 439, 492-93 (1990) (arguing that there should not be any
mandatory testing of health care workers until there is evidence of an actual hazard to patients). See
also Denise C. Singleton, Note, Nonconsensual HIV Testing in the Health Care Seuing: The Case
for Extending the Occupational Protections of California Proposition 96 to Health Care Workers,
26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1251, 1287-88 (1993) (arguing that if health care workers can document
exposure to a patient's blood or body fluids, they have the option of requiring a nonconsenting
patient to undergo an HIV test).
16. Gordon G. Keyes, Health-Care Professionals with AIDS: The Risk of Transmission
Balanced Against the Interests of Professionals and Institutions, 16 J.C. & U.L. 589 (1990). Keyes
proposes that hospitals and health care institutions should restrict the performance of invasive
procedures by HIV positive practitioners because, although the risk of transmission is extremely low,
it is still a risk. Id. However, HIV positive practitioners should not be restricted from performing
non-invasive procedures because in those situations, no chance of blood transfer exists. Id.
Iivasive procedures, which include most surgeries, require the health care worker to operate
inside a body cavity and pose the greatest risk of HIV transmission through blood to blood exposure
because it is not uncommon for health care workers to be cut during surgery. Non-invasive
procedures involve mere talking and touching procedures and therefore do not pose the same risks
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HIV positive test results , ' and discrimination.' Adaptation and solutions to
as invasive procedures. See Watson, supra note 6, at 745-46.
17. Significant controversy surrounds the issue of disclosure by health care workers about their
HIV or AIDS status to their patients. This issue is complex. On one side there is the public's
interest in protection from exposure to HIV or AIDS. On the other side there is the health care
worker's interest in protection from an invasion of privacy and potential discrimination. See Jennifer
Hertz, Note, Physicians with AIDS: A Proposal for Efficient Disclosure, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 749
(1992) (proposing an economic analysis of the costs and benefits of disclosure based on Judge
Learned Hand's B < P*L formula from United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d
Cir. 1947)); see also Michelle Wilcox DeBarge, Note, The Performnance ofInvasive Procedures by
HIV-Infected Doctors: The Duty to Disclose Under the Informed Consent Doctrine, 25 CONN. L.
REv. 991, 1016-23 (1993) (arguing that the performance of invasive procedures by HIV infected
physicians poses a risk of HIV infection to the patient and, therefore, under the doctrine of informed
consent, doctors should be required to disclose their HIV status); Jody B. Gabel, Comment, Liability
for "KIowing " Transmission of HIV: The Evolution of a Duty to Disclose, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
981, 1012-27 (1994) (arguing that a duty to disclose applies to HIV-positive health care professionals
who perform exposure prone procedures).
Controversy also exists over whether patients have a duty to reveal their HIV status to their
physicians. See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 588 N.Y.S.2d 236, 241-43 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992). The Doe
court held that the patient had a legal duty to reveal his HIV status to his physician, reasoning that
the risk of HIV transmission in invasive procedures is equal to the risk of transmission in sexual
activity. Id. at 241. The court further reasoned that anyone who poses a risk of transmission of any
communicable disease to another has a duty to warn others to stem the spread of disease. Id. at 242.
See also Samuel Oddi, Reverse Informed Consent: The Unreasonably Dangerous Patient, 46 VAND.
L. REV. 1417, 1429-35 (1993) (arguing that patients have a duty to inform health care professionals
of material risks (in particular HIV-infection) associated with the patient's care).
Another issue of debate is whether physicians have a duty to warn foreseeable third parties
who are at risk of contracting AIDS from the physician's patient. Michael L. Closen & Scott H.
Isaacman, Notifying Private Third Parties at Risk for lfIV Infection, TRIAL, May 1989, at 50; see
Siobhan Spillane, Note, AIDS: Establishing a Physician's Duty to Warn, 21 RUTOER L.J. 645, 652-
61 (1990) (proposing that physicians have a duty to warn foreseeable third parties who may contract
the AIDS virus from the physician's patient).
Stemming from the debate over a physician's duty to warn is the precedent set forth in
Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). In Tarasoff, a
psychotherapist's patient made violent threats against his former girlfriend during therapy, and the
psychotherapist did not notify the girlfriend or the authorities about the threats. Id. at 341. The
patient stabbed the girlfriend to death on campus, and her parents sued the university and the
psychotherapist for breach of duty. Id. The court held that a special relationship existed between
the therapist and his patient and that this relationship created affirmative duties on the part of the
therapist for the benefit of the patient's intended victim, even though notification would breach the
therapist's confidentiality to his patient. Id. at 349-51. Tarasoff established that liability for failure
to warn applies when the object of the patient's threats or hostility is identifiable and the harm to
the victim is foreseeable. Id. C. Kenneth E. Labowitz, Beyond Tarasoff: AIDS and the Obligation
to Breach Confidentiality, 9 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 495, 512-17 (1990) (arguing that the
Tarasoffrule should be applied in HIV/AIDS cases where the physician can identify foreseeable third
parties who are at risk of contracting HIV/AIDS from the physician's patient). See also Sten L.
Gustafson, Comment, No Longer the Last to Know: A Proposal for Mandatory Notfication of
Spouses of HIV infected Individuals, 29 Hous. L. REv. 991, 1020-27 (1992) (proposing to
statutorily require physicians to notify, through state health authorities, the spouse of an HIV or
AIDS positive patient when the diagnosis is made). But see Diaz Reyes v. United States, 770 F.
Supp. 58, 63 (D.P.R. 1991) (holding that a hospital was not liable to a wife for its failure to notify
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the HIV crisis are problematic. The legal system is slow, cumbersome, and
unable to quickly adapt to new crises that are suddenly thrust upon it,19 while
HIV is swift and relentless. Additionally, many citizens and legislators still do
not realize the magnitude of the crisis.'
her that her husband had tested positive for HIV), affid, 971 F.2d 744 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 2306 (1992).
18. See Bradley v. University of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d 922, 924 (5th Cir.
1993) (holding that a surgical technician who was infected with HIV was not "otherwise qualified"
under the Rehabilitation Act to continue in his present employment and therefore, his reassignment
as a procurement assistant in the purchasing department was not an act of discrimination); Doe v.
Washington Univ., 780 F. Supp. 628, 634 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (holding that the university could
disenroll a third year dental student who was HI positive because, though minimal, a risk of HIV
transmission existed). The court in Doe based its decision upon the risk of transmission that could
occur to the public given the large number of invasive procedures required to be performed by
students under clinical graduation requirements and the recurrence of self-injury experienced by
dentists. Id. at 632-33.
But see Jasperson v. Jessica's Nail Clinic, 265 Cal. Rptr. 301, 307-08 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)
(holding that the defendant pedicure salon's firing of the plaintiff because he had AIDS violated a
municipal ordinance that prohibited discrimination against individuals with AIDS); Petri v. Bank of
New York Co., 582 N.Y.S.2d 608, 611-12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (holding that the defendants had
to pay unemployment compensation to the plaintiff who was fired because he was HIV positive);
Downtown Hosp. v. Sarris, 588 N.Y.S.2d 748, 751-53 (N.Y. Cir. Ct. 1992) (holding that a landlord
could not evict the plaintiffs solely because they had AIDS); Club Swamp Annex v. White, 561
N.Y.S.2d 609, 610-11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (holding that the plaintiff's employer impermissibly
discriminated against the plaintiff by firing him from his job as a waiter after the plaintiff disclosed
that he had AIDS); Hummer v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 573 So. 2d 135, 137-38 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the plaintiff employee's failure to disclose his HIV positive status
to his employer and his use of one sick leave day per month for treatment was not misconduct and
therefore, the defendants had to pay unemployment benefits to the plaintiff). See also Bradford
McKee, On a Scale of Sorrows Workers with AIDS Can Find Bias Benefit Costs 7ipping the
Balance, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 1992, at F1 (describing employees with HIV or AIDS who lost
their jobs after their employers discovered the employees' health status). See David 1. Schulman,
AIDS Discrimination: Its Nature, Meaning and Function, 12 NOvA L. REv. 1113, 1114-15 (1988)
(reasoning that AIDS discrimination exists because of the ancient human impulse to fracture in times
of crisis and victimize some to bind together the rest).
19. As one commentator stated: "Our legal system is suddenly confronted with the task of
quickly applying old legal principles to a new, misunderstood, and deadly disease, all within a
crowded, overburdened, and understaffed civil and criminal justice system." Abby Rubenfeld,
Today's Plague, Tomorrow's Laws: What Can Lawyers Do When an Incurable Disease Such as
AIDS Threatens to Overwhelm Our Civil and Criminal Sstems?, HUM. RTS. Q., Summer 1987, at
17. Rubenfeld also states that AIDS is "tragically misplaced in a legal system notorious for being
slow and cumbersome." Id. at 19. Rubenfeld correctly asserts that AIDS is a unique problem in
our court system that is overcrowded and slow, for the AIDS virus is swift, relentless, and fatal.
20. While discussing state budget cuts for hospitals, Montana's Lieutenant Governor Dennis
Rehberg stated: "The problem with AIDS is: you got it, you die. So why are we spending money
on the issue?" Montana Lt. Gov. Dennis Rehberg, Perspectives, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 17, 1994, at 13.
What Rehberg and others like him fail to understand is that AIDS does not affect just a small cross
section of the country, and it is not going to disappear by itself. Without money for research on
possible treatments and cures, people will continue to die from the disease, but with money for
research, perhaps a cure will someday be found. In the meantime, the HIV virus is growing
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In the struggle to develop standards of recovery for HIV litigation,
commentators and courts compare HIV with other sexually transmitted
diseases,2  cancer,' and transfusion-related diseases.2 However, no
analogy between HIV and other diseases is completely sufficient because HIV
is dramatically different and unique.'
The only fact that everyone can agree upon is that AIDS is incurable, and
once infected with HIV, it is only a matter of time until individuals will develop
AIDS and die.' Therefore, within this framework of uncertainty and
confusion, it is not surprising that Bessie's fear of HIV infection was acute and
stronger and ignoring it will only lead to more deaths from AIDS.
21. See Bonnie E. Elber, Note, Negligence as a Cause of Action for Sexual Transmission of
AIDS, 19 U. TOL. L. REV. 923, 944-45 (1988) (concluding that courts should impose a legal duty
upon sexually active HIV infected individuals to warn their sexual partners because courts have
imposed a legal duty to warn individuals infected with gonorrhea and genital herpes); Jeanmarie
Papelian, Note, Assessing Liability for Negligent Sexual Transmission of AIDS, 24 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 649, 662-63 (1990) (concluding that the same standard of duty to warn sexual partners of
infection imposed by the courts in transmission of venereal disease and genital herpes should be
applied in HIV transmission cases). See infra notes 190-207 and accompanying text (discussing the
standards imposed in sexually transmitted disease cases which may be applied in HIV transmission
cases).
22. See John Patrick Darby, Note, Tort Liability for the Transmission of the AIDS Virus.
Damages for Fear of AIDS and Prospective AIDS, 45 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 185 (1988). Darby
argues that because of the similarities between HIV and carcinogens, courts analyzing HIV
transmission liability should examine the established law of liability for exposing a plaintiff to a
carcinogen. Id. at 188. Darby stresses the similarities between HIV and cancer by discussing the
fact that the effects of both are not evident for long and variable periods and that both cause deadly
and incurable diseases. Id. See infra notes 105-09 and accompanying text (analyzing fear-of-cancer
and other fear-of-illness cases).
23. Joel B. Korin et al., Civil Liability for the Transmission of AIDS, N.J. LAW., Feb. 1989,
at 41 (suggesting that in HIV-transfusion cases, the courts should seek guidance from cases which
deal with transfusion-related hepatitis because both hepatitis and HIV involve transmission by a viral
agent, donor screening, and testing of blood).
24. Roor-BERNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 31; Dalton, supra note 1, at xv. HIV is also uniquely
dangerous because it is a retrovirns as opposed to an ordinary virus. THE AIDS CAREGIVER'S
HANDBOOK 4 (red Eidson ed., 1988). RNA is usually made from DNA but in a retrovirus, this
process is reversed. Id. Therefore, HIV transcribes its genetic material (RNA) into DNA and then
actually inserts that piece of DNA into the host cell. Id. Because HIV integrates its genetic material
into the host cell, it is unlikely that any treatment can be developed to subsequently remove the
RNA. Id. HIV is easily destroyed when outside the human body, but is virtually indestructible
while in the body. Earl & Kavanaugh, supra note 6, at 1204. At the present time, no treatment
exists that can permanently reverse the suppression of the body's immune system or protect the
human body against HIV. See AIDS POL'Y & L. (BNA), Aug. 6, 1993, at 3.
25. If an individual is infected with HIV, it is only a matter of time until the individual develops
AIDS, which will eventually cause a breakdown of the body's immune system. Once HIV is
established in the body, it cannot be eradicated. Death is inevitable. AIDS POL'Y & L., supra note
24, at 3. The average time between iW infection and development of the AIDS virus is 10.3 years,
and the survival time from then until death is approximately 25 months. Id.
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very real.' However, the Supreme Court of Tennessee ultimately held that
Bessie did not have a viable cause of action and could not recover because she
could not prove actual exposure to HIV. Ironically, if Bessie had lived in
another jurisdiction she may have been allowed to recover, because there is
currently no uniformity among the courts in such cases.'
Bessie's case is only one of many examples in the latest AIDS debate?9
which centers around suits by plaintiffs who are afraid that they have been
exposed to HIV.' The controversy in these cases is whether recovery may be
based on the plaintiff's fear of potential exposure to HIV, and whether the
plaintiff needs to develop HIV to recover.3' The courts have struggled to
26. In the lower court decision that was eventually reversed, Linda L. Pifer, Ph.D., a professor
in the Department of Clinical Laboratory Science at the University of Tennessee microbiology and
an active AIDS researcher for 10 years stated in an affidavit, "All discarded needles and sharps are
presumed to be infectious with regard to the AIDS virus and other blood and body fluid
transmissible agents. Discarded needles must be presumed to be and are in fact capable of
transmitting the AIDS virus." Carroll v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Servs., 1992 WL 276717,
*4 (Tenn. App. 1992).
27. Carro/, 868 S.W.2d at 593-94.
28. See, e.g., Bordelonv. St. Frances Cabrini Hosp., 640 So. 2d 476, 478-79 (La. App. 1994)
(holding that the plaintiff who was erroneously given someone else's blood during surgery stated a
cause of action for emotional distress stemming from her fear that she had been exposed to
HIV/AIDS).
29. See supra notes 11-18, 21-24 and accompanying text.
30. Stephanie B. Goldberg, AIDS Phobia: Reasonable Fears or Unreasonable Lawsuits?, 78
A.B.A. J., June 1992, at 88.
31. Id. Critics give the nickname "AIDS-Phobia" to these HIV-fear cases because they see the
cases as mere litigation opportunities for plaintiffs' phobic fears of HIV. See, e.g., Pete Bowles,
Divorce Suit Seeks $1Mfor AIDS Phobia, NEWSDAY, July 30, 1987, at 7. The nickname is based
upon a concern that the HIV-fear cases have the potential to perpetuate AIDS hysteria and
unreasonable fears of how exposure to HIV occurs. DONALD H.J. HERMANN & ScoTw BURRIs,
Torts: Private Lawsuits about HIV, in AIDS LAW TODAY, supra note 1, at 344. As a result of the
apprehension that HIV-fear cases have the potential to create problems for the courts and society,
courts are split as to whether and to what extent plaintiffs should be awarded damages for emotional
distress resulting from potential HIV exposure, wherever it occurs. Id.
Instead of the term "AIDS-Phobia," this note uses the term "HIV-fear" because in legitimate
cases, the emotional distress is not a "phobia" which is defined as "an illogical fear." WEBSTER'S
NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DIcTIoNARY 883 (1984). A "phobia" is an unreasonable fear that occurs
when the level of anxiety is not proportional to the actual threat. W. BUTOLLO, Phobic Behavior,
in AIDS PHOBIA: DISEASE PATTERN AND POSSIBILITIES OF TREATmENT 48 (1988). Normal anxiety
is a proportionate reaction to the perceived threat, while neurotic anxiety involves a disproportionate
reaction to the objective danger. Rot.Lo MAY, THE MEANING OF ANXIETY 209, 214 (1977).
This normal-neurotic differentiation is important in HIV-fear cases in determining whether the
plaintiff's fear is reasonable. In states that require proof of actual exposure, the plaintiff's anxiety
is normal only if the plaintiff can offer proof of the actual channel of exposure, while in other states,
the determination of whether the plaintiff's anxiety is normal does not hinge upon the plaintiff's
ability to prove actual exposure. See infra notes 131-77 and accompanying text.
The term "AIDS-Phobia" implies that all of these suits are based on unreasonable fears. This
unwarranted generalization overlooks the existence of legitimate claims intended, in part, to deter
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establish a standard of recovery, but out of their apprehension of a flood of
claims,32 many courts have established an extremely rigid standard that denies
recovery for legitimate claims by plaintiffs who fear that they have been exposed
to this fatal illness."
In HIV-fear cases, the courts are split over whether the plaintiff may
recover absent physical injury,' whether the plaintiff must first develop HIV
before recovery is allowed,35 and whether the actual channel of exposure to
HIV must be proven.' Some disagreement also exists over the time period of
negligent and irresponsible behavior that places society at risk from the spread of HIV. See infra
notes 213-17 and accompanying text. Plaintiffs who legitimately fear that they have been exposed
to HIV deserve compensation for their trauma of potential exposure to a lingering and unmerciful
disease for which there is no cure. Edward A. Adams, Federal Law Allows Fear-Of-AIDS Claim,
N.Y. L.J., Feb. 1, 1993, at 2. Adams' article is a summary of the trial court's opinion in Marhica
v. Long Island R.R., 810 F. Supp. 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), where the plaintiff was stuck by a
hypodermic needle while at work. The court reasoned that "[ti]he finder of fact may conclude that
the plaintiff has sustained sufficient physical injury to support an award for mental anguish... even
though there is no proof at this time that the plaintiff has, in fact, contracted HIV/AIDS."
Marchica, 810 F. Supp. at 453.
32. See Brian R. Garves, In Fear-of-AIDS Cases, Proof is Key Element-Can a Plaintiff
Recover Without Actual Exposure to the Disease?, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 26, 1993, at 27-30 (explaining
that courts rigidly require proof of the actual channel of exposure in HIV-fear cases because they
fear that fraudulent claims would be overwhelming if the courts abandoned the standard as a result
of the subjective nature of the claims).
33. See, e.g., Lubowitz v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., Northern Division, 623 A.2d 3 (Pa.
1993). In Lubowitz, the plaintiff was informed that blood which subsequently tested positive for
AIDS was used during the plaintiff's in vitro fertilization procedure. The court held that, although
the plaintiff was exposed to AIDS during the procedure, she could not recover for her fear of
developing AIDS and, instead, could only recover if she actually developed AIDS in the future. Id.
at 5.
See also Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Doe, 840 P.2d 288 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). In
Transamerica, the plaintiffs were trained medical professionals who witnessed a car accident and
then administered medical attention to the passengers. While giving cardiopulmonary resuscitation
and other life-saving procedures, the plaintiffs came in direct contact with the passengers' blood.
Both plaintiffs had open skin lesions that were at the area of blood contact. The plaintiffs were
notified five days after the accident that one of the passengers was HIV positive. The plaintiffs then
sought compensation from their insurance company, Transamerica, under their motorist coverage
for bodily injury and damages, which they argued included fear from exposure to blood infected
with HIV. The court held that the plaintiffs could not recover, reasoning that neither the plaintiffs'
exposure to HIV infected blood, nor the drawing of their blood for HIV tests, constituted "bodily
injury" under the insurance policy. Id. at 291.
Part of the problem with the Transamerica decision is that courts have disparate definitions
of what constitutes bodily injury; consequently, there is inconsistent case law. See, e.g., Marriott
v. Sedco Forex Int'l Resources, 827 F. Supp. 59, 73 (D. Mass. 1993) (holding that exposure to HIV
infected blood did constitute a physical injury).
34. See infra notes 115-21, 127-30 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 131-77 and accompanying text.
Hansen: Establishing Uniformity in HIV-Fear Cases: A Modification of the
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1995
1260 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29
allowable recovery,37 because there is no consensus as to the accuracy of
determining how soon individuals will know that they have developed HIV.1
The lack of uniformity in society's response to the HIV crisis and the split
among the courts as to the standard of recovery in HIV-fear cases merely
creates more confusion and should be resolved to deter negligent behavior and
to decrease actual and potential HIV exposure.
The purpose of this Note is to trace the events and background that have
led to the current HIV-fear cases and to propose a judicial approach that will
provide for uniformity as to the standard of recovery that should be employed
in these cases. The HIV-fear cases are highly emotional, and critics argue that
they present potential risks of perpetuating HIV hysteria and discrimination.39
Therefore, the courts must establish a standard of recovery that will not increase
misconceptions about the transmission of HIV and open the proverbial Pandora's
Box.'
37. See infra notes 178-89 and accompanying text.
38. The majority opinion among medical researchers is that 95% of those who develop HIV
will test positive for the virus within six months of acquiring it. C. Robert Horsburgh et al.,
Duration of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection Before Detection of Antibody, THE LANCET,
Sept. 16, 1989, at 637. However, the 95% figure is criticized by those who argue that the tests used
to determine HIV infection are inaccurate. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
39. Goldberg, supra note 30, at 88. In reality, the HIV-fear cases can be used as educational
tools of how HIV is transmitted. Although the information about transmission has been concrete
for years, there are still those in society who fear that HIV can be transmitted casually. Goldberg
fears that HIV-fear cases will increase people's fears about AIDS and result in discrimination by
those who do not really understand how HIV is transmitted. Id.
The possibility of discrimination against HIV-infected individuals is significant, and both the
federal and state governments have made attempts to minimize employment discrimination. Federal
and state laws designate HIV and AIDS patients as "handicapped"; therefore, HIV and AIDS
patients are entitled to the same protections that other handicapped individuals receive in hiring and
employment. Victoria M. Bunsen, Employees, Privacy Rights and AIDS, 19 COLO. LAw. 1839
(1990). The handicap designation laws protect individuals from discrimination by those who fear
that HIV is casually transmitted. "Because medical studies indicate that there is no reason to fear
casual daily contact with an AIDS patient, any form of discrimination or refusal to work with such
a person should not be tolerated." Id. at 1840. Consequently, employers face liability if they fail
to reprimand co-workers who refuse to work with an HIV or AIDS positive individual. Id.
The AIDS crisis creates issues of disclosure in employment and many commentators advocate
that disclosure of an individual's HIV or AIDS status is only necessary or warranted if in the course
of performing their duty, the individuals pose a risk of transmitting HIV. Thus, in most jobs,
whether an individual has HIV or AIDS is irrelevant, because that status will not affect their ability
to perform their job or present a risk of transmission to others. See supra note 18; infra notes 210-
12 and accompanying text.
40. EDITH HAMILTON, MYTHOLOGY 88 (1942). In Greek mythology, the gods gave Pandora
a box in which each god placed something harmful. The gods instructed Pandora to never open the
box, but her curiosity overcame her. When she opened the box, plagues, sorrow, and mischief
escaped. However, there was good in the box in the form of hope, and Greek mythology maintained
that it was humankind's sole comfort against all of the evil which had escaped. Whenever an area
of recovery faces possible expansion, commentators equate the action to opening Pandora's box and
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No uniformity exists among the courts in dealing with the HIV-fear
cases, 41 and the result is that many courts deny recovery to plaintiffs who
legitimately fear that they have been exposed to a fatal disease due to someone's
negligence.4' Judicial uniformity is necessary to deter negligent behavior that
may result in HIV exposure. Although the fear of HIV is real, recognition of
HIV-fear cases does not mean that plaintiffs will be given license to perpetuate
unrealistic fears about how exposure to the virus occurs. Instead, the solution
in this Note's proposed judicial approach. not only removes unjust barriers that
bar recovery for legitimate claims, but also establishes boundaries to deny
fraudulent claims.43
Section II analyzes the general history of negligent infliction of emotional
distress in the courts and in the psychological community and illustrates how the
courts have increasingly recognized mental injury claims as legitimate.'
Section II also analyzes how courts have dealt with emotional distress claims in
suits for the transmission of HIV.' Section III analyzes the current trend of
HIV-fear cases and the problems that plague the courts regarding the proper
standard of recovery.4 In addition, Section III examines the role of
comparative negligence in HIV-fear cases, because as in all tort cases, the
behavior of the plaintiff may also be at issue.4' Finally, Section IV proposes
a judicial approach to gain uniformity in HIV-fear cases.'
This Note's proposed judicial approach abandons the physical manifestation
argue that doing so will only lead to more suffering. Pandora's box was used as an analogy when
courts began to abandon the physical impact requirement in negligent infliction of emotional distress
claims, and it also appeared when courts began recognizing pure psychic emotional claims. The
same analogy is now made in HIV-fear cases. Courts are afraid that without a rigid standard of
recovery, a flood of fraudulent claims will descend upon the courts, and courts will be unable to
adequately recognize genuine claims given their subjective nature. Garves, supra note 32, at 27-30.
See also infra notes 131-77, 226-52 and accompanying text (analyzing the courts' standards of
recovery in HIV-fear cases and concluding that a different standard of recovery will not open the
floodgates of litigation).
41. See infra notes 105-26, 151-74 and accompanying text.
42. See Burk v. Sage Products, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285, 287 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that a
paramedic who was pricked by a needle protruding from a defective disposal container could not
recover for his fear of exposure to HIV because he could not prove that the needle was previously
used on an HIV positive patient); Poole v. Therapeutic Corp., 698 F. Supp. 1367, 1372 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (holding that, although the plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to constitute a reasonable fear for
her safety from exposure to AIDS, absent any allegations of physical injury or illness resulting from
her emotional distress, she could not recover).
43. See infra notes 226-52 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 55-104 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 55-76, 86-104 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 105-89 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 190-207 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 226-52 and accompanying text.
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rule and proof of the actual channel of HIV exposure in favor of a requirement
that plaintiffs must trace their fear to a distinct event of potential exposure. '
This approach is a modification of the distinct event approach established in
Marriott v. Sedco Forex International.0 Under the modified distinct event
approach, this Note concludes that the physical impact rule,51 physical
manifestation rule,' and the actual channel proof requirement" are unjust
standards that should be abandoned in favor of a more moderate approach that
recognizes the legitimacy of independent mental injuries. '
II. THE EVOLUTION OF NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS AS A RECOGNIZED CAUSE OF ACTION
For centuries, philosophers and physicians contemplated the relationship
between the body and the mind to discover why emotions may manifest
themselves in physiological reactions.- Psychologists have asserted for years
that a cause and effect relationship can exist between emotional stress and the
subsequent physical symptoms that occur.' The early courts began to
49. See infra notes 226-52 and accompanying text.
50. 1993 WL 287699 (D. Mass. 1993). See infra notes 151-63 and accompanying text for a
detailed explanation of the approach established in Marriot and why discussion of a modification
of the approach is necessary.
51. The physical impact rule requires that a physical injury accompanythe plaintiffs emotional
distress. See Infra notes 73-86 and accompanying text.
52. The physical manifestation rule requires that the plaintiff's emotional distress manifest itself
in physical symptoms. See infra notes 64-68, 73-76, 87-90, 94-96 and accompanying text.
53. The channel of exposure rule requires the plaintiff to prove the actual means of HIV
exposure. See infra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 226-28, 235-38 and accompanying text.
55. In 1884, the first scientific attempt to explain the relationship between emotional stress and
physiological accompaniments was published by William James, a psychologist. EUOENB E.
LEvr, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ANXIETY 92-93 (1967). One year later, a Danish psychologist, Carl
Lange, advanced a similar explanation. Id. The James-Lange theory proposed that an individual's
perception of an exciting stimulus will provoke a reaction by an individual's reflexes. Id.
The James-Lange explanation was accepted for over 40 years until the 1920s, when
psychologists Walter Cannon and Philip Bard proved that it was unreasonable and proposed that
emotional experience and physiological reactions occur simultaneously. Id. at 93. Eventually, the
Cannon-Bard theory was proven to be too simplistic, but it was seen as an advancement in proving
that there can be a connection between individuals' emotional and physical reactions. Id.
The modem explanation of the relationship between the body and the mind is that the limbic
system in the brain is the seat of emotional control, and when it is stimulated in certain ways,
various emotional responses occur. Id. at 93-95. Modern society recognizes that individuals do not
usually experience a physical injury or an illness without also undergoing a change in their emotional
state. Melvin L. Selzer, M.D., Psychological Stress and Legal Concepts of Disease Causation, 56
CORNELL L. REV. 951, 952 (1971).
56. Hubert Winston Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for
Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. Rnv. 193, 215 (1944). Smith states that volumes of literature exist on
studies conducted to explain the relationship between emotional stress and physical symptoms. Id.
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recognize these scientific assertions and established the premise that mental
anguish can be either the result of, or accompanied by, a physical injury."
However, many early courts understood this relationship to mean that if a
plaintiff's emotional distress is legitimate, it will always manifest itself in
physical symptoms.' Consequently, those courts refused to accept the notion
that emotional distress could exist independently."
Although the scientific community long ago recognized the reality that
emotional stress and fear exist independently, the legal community has been
skeptical of this premise.' Courts were afraid to allow recovery solely for
emotional distress because of a belief that emotional injuries were intangible,
and somehow not as real as physical pain.6 Courts also felt that emotional
distress was difficult to value because people were affected in different ways.
Therefore, it was too speculative for the court to measure in terms of
damages.' Consequently, the result has been a slow evolution of the
See Seizer, supra note 55, at 952 (asserting that almost all physical injuries or significant physical
illnesses alter an individual's emotional state, and only rare individuals do not suffer an emotional
change). Selzer also states that changes in the emotional state often create a related physiological
change. Id.
57. JOHN G. FLxEMNO, THE LAW OF TORTS 146 (7th ed. 1987).
58. Terry Morehead Dworkin, Fear ofDisease and Delayed Manifestation Injuries: A Solution
or a Pandora's Bar?, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 527, 529 (1984). See Merton E. Marks & James T.
Acuff, Jr., Legal Issues In the Recoveryfor Fear of Future Disease Without Present Physical Injury,
41 FED'N INS. CORP. COUNS. Q. 235, 236 (1991) (describing the belief that if emotional distress
did not manifest itself in physical symptoms, it was trivial, feigned, or imagined).
59. Frances C. Whiteman, Toxic Emotional Distress Claims: The Emerging TrendforRecovery
Absent Physical Injury, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 995, 997 (1991). Courts justified their refusal to
entertain pure psychic emotional distress claims by asserting that physical symptoms validated the
emotional distress claim. See Infra notes 64-67, 73-75, 86-91, 95-97 and accompanying text
(analyzing the physical manifestation rule).
60. See generally Peter A. Bell, The Bell Tols: Toward Full Tort Recoveryfor Psychic Injury,
36 U. FLA. L. REV. 333 (1984). Courts have been reluctant to allow recovery for emotional
distress absent physical symptoms because of an apprehension that a deluge of fraudulent claims will
descend upon the courts. Id. at 336. See also Smith, supra note 56, at 194 (arguing that the
skepticism of couts is the result of a rule rooted in English and American law that plaintiffs cannot
recover damages for their emotional distress absent another legal injury).
61. Self-Insurers and Risk Managers: Annual Survey, 27 TORT & INS. LJ. 445,446 (Jerry A.
Lindheim, ed. 1992). The evolution of emotional distress as a cause of action has been slow
because the courts have been wary to recognize a claim that is difficult to measure since there is no
tangible physical injury. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEErON ON TORTS § 54, at 361
(5th ed. 1984).
62. See, e.g., Victorian Rys. Comm'n v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222, 57 L. J. P. C. 69 (P.C.
1888) (holding that allowing damages for fright would raise tremendous problems of proof because
individuals are affected differently by emotional stress and therefore, the court would have to
speculate as to the extent of the plaintiffs emotional injury); Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni,
73 So. 205, 207 (Ala. Ct. App. 1916) (holding that emotional distress claims are too subtle and
speculative to measure); Gardner v. Cumberland Tel. Co., 268 S.W. 1108, 1110 (Ky. 1925)
(denying recovery for emotional distress and reasoning that it is very easy to assert a claim of mental
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recognition of emotional distress as an independent compensable injury.'
Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claims were originally
limited to cases where plaintiffs could demonstrate an objective consequence,
such as an actual illness.' However, courts perceived less risk when
recognizing intentional infliction of emotional distress as a compensable tort
theory.' The logic is that outrageous intentional acts are more reliable
indicators that severe emotional distress will result than are simply negligent or
unreasonable acts." The courts reasoned that if the defendant's act was
outrageous enough to justify damages to compensate the plaintiff,' then the
certainty of subsequent emotional distress was sufficiently clear.'
In contrast, recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED)
faced greater skepticism and consequently, it has been in a state of fluctuation
during the last twenty years as courts have struggled to define limits for
recovery.' Courts feared that recognition of claims for NIED would open the
floodgates of litigation to fraudulent claims.' Consequently, courts imposed
anguish, but extremely hard to disprove).
63. See generally Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 136, 140 (1992)
(analyzing the history of emotional distress claims); Nancy Campbell Brown, Note, Predicting the
Future: Present Mental Anguish for Fear of Developing Cancer in the Future as a Result of Past
Asbestos Exposure, 23 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 337 (1993) (tracing the recognition of emotional
distress claims as legitimate and compensable).
64. FLEMING, supra note 57, at 32.
65. TERRENCEF. KIELY, MODERN TORT LIABILITY: REcOVERY IN THE '90S 109-10 (1990).
Wilkinson v. Downton, 2 Q.B. 57 (1897) was the first case to recognize the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress as a separate cause of action by reasoning that intentional harm is
"antisocial and warrants reproof." FLEMINO, supra note 57, at 30.
66. KEETON Er AL., supra note 61, at 360-61.
67. KIELY, supra note 65, at 110. See also Dworkin, supra note 58, at 530 (explaining that
the outrageousness could either be the nature of the conduct itself or abuse of a special position or
knowledge).
68. See Dworkin, supra note 58, at 530-31 (analyzing the justification by courts that emotional
distress caused by intentional behavior is easier to test for legitimacy than emotional distress caused
by negligent behavior).
69. KIELY, supra note 65, at 109. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 61, § 54, at 360-61
(explaining that the three principal concerns that have caused courts to impose limitations on the
recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress are: 1) the harm is often temporary; 2) the
claims could be falsified or imagined; and 3) the unfairness of punishing a merely negligent
defendant for results that appear to be remote from the wrongful conduct).
70. WILLIAM L. PROSsER, HANDBOOx OF THE LAW OF TORTs § 55, at 350-51 (3d ed. 1964).
See Spearman v. McCrary, 58 So. 927 (Ala. Ct. App. 1912); Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., 148
N.Y.S. 3940 (N.Y. 1914) (holding that recovery for emotional distress was allowed when
accompanied by a physical injury). See also Dworkin, supra note 58, at 529-30 (analyzing the
limitations imposed by courts in emotional distress claims to prevent a deluge of fraudulent claims).
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the physical impact7' and physical manifestation' rules to prevent a deluge
of fraudulent claims.
A. The Physical Impact and Physical Manifestation Rules
The logic behind the physical impact rule is that the physical impact that
accompanies the mental distress provides assurance that the mental distress is not
fraudulent or simulated.73 Another limitation courts impose is the same
physical manifestation rule applied in IED claims.74 Under the physical
manifestation rule, courts deny recovery for NIED unless the plaintiff can prove
that the emotional distress has manifested itself in physical symptoms." As
with the physical impact rule, the goal of the physical manifestation rule is to
limit recovery to claims that can be readily verified as honest and legitimate
71. See supra note 51 for the definition of the physical impact rule. See infra notes 73-87 and
accompanying text (discussing the physical impact rule).
72. See supra note 52 for the definition of the physical manifestation rule. See also infra notes
64-68, 73-76, 87-90, 94-96 and accompanying text (discussing the physical manifestation rule).
73. FLEMiNG, supra note 57, at 145. See also PROSSER, supra note 70, at 350-51 (explaining
that the theory behind the rule was that the impact provides the "desired guarantee that the mental
disturbance is genuine"). See, e.g., Preece v. Baur, 143 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Idaho 1956); Kramer
v. Ricksmeier, 139 N.W. 1091 (Iowa 1913); Morgan v. Hightower's Adm'r, 163 S.W.2d 21 (Ky.
1942); Smith v. Gowdy, 244 S.W. 678 (Ky. 1922); Falzone v. Busch, 214 A.2d 12 (N.J. 1965);
Seidenbach's, Inc. v. Williams, 361 P.2d 185 (Okla. 1961); Knaub v. Gotwalt, 220 A.2d 646, 647
(Pa. 1966) (holding that although the plaintiffs were exposed to physical injury and feared for their
safety, they could not recover for their mental suffering absent a physical impact).
See also Southern Express Co. v. Byers, 240 U.S. 612, 615 (1916) (holding that emotional
pain without physical injury is too vague for legal redress); Holland v. Good Bros., 61 N.E.2d 544,
545 (Mass. 1945) (holding that mental anguish unaccompanied by physical injury is not
compensable); Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry., 50 N.W. 1034, 1035 (Minn. 1892) (holding that mental
injury alone is not a legitimate cause of action). The physical impact theory was based upon the
belief that emotional damage only occurs as the result of an individual's physical injuries. David
J. Leibson, Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Caused by Physical Injury to Another, 15
J. FAM. L. 163, 168 (1977). The courts which adhered to the physical impact rule believed that
mental trauma alone was not a sufficient basis for recovery. Id.
74. See supra note 52 for the definition of the physical manifestation rule. See also infra notes
64-68, 73-76, 87-90, 94-96 and accompanying text (analyzing the application and limitations of the
physical manifestation rule).
75. Dworkin, supra note 58, at 531. Presently, 37 jurisdictions require some form of physical
injury before allowing recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress: Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Scott D. Marrs, Mind Over Body: Trends Regarding the Physical Injury
Requirement in Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress and "Fear of Disease" Cases, 28 TORT
& INS. L.J. 1 (1992).
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through tangible physical proof.76
Presently, in HIV transmission cases, the plaintiff's IV or AIDS infection
provides tangible proof of injury for the courts." The courts recognize that
claims for emotional distress can be litigated in connection with the plaintiff's
claim of HIV or AIDS infection.' Consequently, claims for emotional distress
are litigated in connection with claims for the transmission of HIV, based on
theories of breach of implied warranty against blood banks,' negligence,'
76. The rationale was that physical symptoms could not be easily feigned; thus only legitimate
emotional distress claims would result in physical symptoms. See Julie A. Davies, Direct Actions
for Emotional Harm: Is Compromise Possible?, 67 WASH. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1992) (arguing that
proof of some injury is appropriate to prevent fraudulent claims because emotional distress claims
are intangible, and while neither the physical impact or manifestation riles are perfect, they
adequately monitor plaintiffs' claims).
But see Terri Krivosha Herring, Note, Administering the Tort of Negligent Inflction of Mental
Distress: A Synthesis, 4 CARDOZO L. REv. 487, 497-98 (1983) (arguing that proof of physical
injury is unnecessary to monitor plaintiffs' claims because psychiatrists can use various tests and
methods to determine whether plaintiffs' emotional distress claims are legitimate).
77. Philip H. Corboy, Legal Implications: The AIDS Crisis, BRIEF, Fall 1986, at 41. Courts
have held that a plaintiff infected with the AIDS virus is "indeed injured" and therefore has a
recognizably compensable injury. Id.
78. Richard Carl Schoenstein, Standards of Conduct, Multiple Defendants, and Full Recovery
of Damages In Tort Liability for the Transmission of fiman Immunodeficiency Virus, 18 HOFSThA
L. REV. 37, 41-42 (1989).
79. Most courts bar such liability for blood banks and hospitals. Korin, supra note 23, at 41.
The rationale behind barring the liability is 'based on a concern for the adequacy of the nation's
blood supply." Id. See also Kathryn W. Pieplow, Comment, AIDS, Blood Banks and the Courts:
The Legal Response to Transfusion Acquired Disease, 38 S.D. L. REV. 609 (1992) (arguing for a
restatement of blood shield statutes that bar liability against hospitals and blood banks for
transfusion-acquired AIDS to establish a sole medical and legal standard of care); Skiver & Hickey,
supra note 5, at 841-51 (analyzing claims against blood banks for the transmission of HIV or AIDS).
See Wilson v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 517 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that a blood bank was not negligent in failing to ask donors about their sexual orientation
in order to determine if they were at risk for AIDS, because in 1983, those questions had not yet
been endorsed by the government or the blood banking associations); Brown v. United Blood Servo.,
858 P.2d 391 (Nev. 1993) (holding that the blood bank's failure to question donors about their
history of venereal disease to screen potentially HIV infected blood was not contrary to the practice
of other members of the blood bank community at the time of the incident).
But see Quintana v. United Blood Servo., 827 P.2d 509, 518 (Colo. 1992) (allowing the jury,
for the first time in United States history, to scrutinize blood industry standards at the time of an
HIV-tainted transfusion in 1983). The jury decided that the blood bank was negligent and that the
entire 1983 industry standard was inadequate. Jessamine R. Talavera, Quintana v. United Blood
Services: Fxamining Industry Practice in Transfusion-Related AIDS Cases, 2 CoRNI.L J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 475,477 (1993). See alto J.K. & Susie L. Wadley Research Inst. & Blood Bank v. Beeson,
835 S.W.2d 689, 699 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the blood bank was negligent in its
collection of blood and this negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's HIV infection).
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battery,8' and fraud.82 In all of these cases, the cause of action is brought
after the plaintiff contracts HIV and in many cases, after the plaintiff is AIDS
positive." Therefore, the emotional distress claims in HIV transmission
litigation follow the same evolution as other emotional distress claims, where the
emotional distress is attached to an objective, tangible, physical impact or
manifestation.' In these cases, the physical impact or manifestation is the
plaintiff's HIV or AIDS infection.'
Consistent problems exist with both the physical impact and physical
manifestation rules in all emotional distress claims. The physical impact rule led
to absurd results with courts holding that even the most trivial occurrences, such
80. Corboy, supra note 77, at 40-42. Under the theory of negligence, the plaintiff must
establish four elements: 1) a legal duty on the part of the defendant; 2) a breach of that duty by the
defendant; 3) causation between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury (the HIV
infection); and 4) damages to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Doe v. State, 588 N.Y.S.2d 698, 702 (N.Y.
Ct. Cl. 1992) (holding that correction officers were negligent in restraining a combative HIV-
infected inmate when the plaintiff nurse was stuck by a needle that had been used on the inmate and
subsequently developed HIV).
Significant controversy has always surrounded the issue of whether sexually active individuals
have a duty to warn their sexual partners that they are at risk of contracting a sexually transmitted
disease. Given the deadly nature of AIDS, the controversy over a duty to warn sexual partners of
any risks has increased. David P. Brigham, You Never Told Me . . . You Never Asked: Ton
Liability for the Sexual Transmission of Aids, 91 DiCK. L. REV. 529, 544 (1986). See C.A.U. v.
R.L., 438 N.W.2d 441, 444 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that the plaintiff's former fiancee was
not liable for sexually transmitting AIDS to the plaintiff in 1985). The court determined that the key
in cases for AIDS transmission is whether it is reasonable for the defendant to have constructive
knowledge of the defendant's capability of transmitting the AIDS virus. Id. The court reasoned that
at the time in which the parties engaged in sexual contact, the general societal notion was that AIDS
could not be transmitted heterosexually. Id. Therefore, it was not reasonable to impose upon the
defendant the constructive knowledge that he was carrying the AIDS virus. Id. See also Doe v.
Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382, 1393 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (holding that the plaintiff must show that the
defendant knew or should have known that he was infected with HIV).
81. HERMANN & BuRRis, supra note 31, at 342. To satisfy a claim for battery in AIDS
litigation, the plaintiff must show that the defendant knew that he or she was infected and either
intended to cause the contact that led to transmission of the AIDS virus or recklessly disregarded
the risk of transmission and proceeded with the contact. Id. The plaintiff does not have to show
that the defendant purposely sought to transmit the infection, but instead that the defendant intended
to cause the contact that could lead to infection. Id.
82. See Osbom v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 106 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that the blood bank could only be liable for negligent misrepresentation and not fraud or
products liability when the plaintiffs' son contracted AIDS from a blood transfusion during heart
surgery and, therefore, the case was remanded for a new trial). The negligent misrepresentation was
based on a statement made by the blood bank to the plaintiffs that blood donations could not be
directed for use in the plaintiffs' son's operation. Id. at 106. In reality, the bank's procedure was
to discourage, not to forbid, directed donations. Id.
83. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text (describing cases where the plaintiffs sued
for the transmission of HIV or AIDS, and thus had a tangible physical injury).
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as dust in the eye, constituted a physical impact." Due to results such as
these, the impact rule began to lose its effectiveness and consequently, almost
every jurisdiction has abandoned it." Similar to the physical impact rule, the
physical manifestation rule has created inconsistent case law because courts have
varying definitions of what constitutes a physical manifestation.'
86. PRossER, supra note 70, at 350-51. Prosser summarizes the various approaches by the
courts in applying the physical impact nile that led to ridiculous results. "But the same courts have
found 'impact' in minor contacts with the person which play no part in causing the real harm, and
in themselves can have no importance whatever." Id. at 350 (citation omitted). See Clark v.
Choctawhatchee Elec. Coop., 107 So.2d 609, 611-12 (Fla. 1958) (holding that a falling power line
that discharged an electrical current satisfied the physical impact rule); Christy Bros. Circus v.
Tumage, 144 S.E. 680, 681 (Ga. 1928) (holding that a horse's evacuation of his bowels into the
plaintiff's lap constituted a physical impact); Kenney v. Wong Len, 128 A. 343, 346-47 (N.H. 1925)
(holding that a mouse hair ingested by the plaintiff in a bowl of stew satisfied the physical impact
rule); Porter v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 63 A. 860, 860 (N.J. 1906) (holding that dust in the
plaintiff's eyes constituted a physical impact); Morton v. Stack, 170 N.E. 869, 869 (Ohio 1930)
(holding that smoke inhalation was a physical impact); Hess v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 56 A.2d
89, 91 (Pa. 1948) (holding that a physical impact occurred when an electric wire struck a car). See
also Herrii.g, supra note 76, at 496 (describing how the courts began to hold that the slightest
interference with the plaintiff's person was a physical impact to alleviate the rigidity of the physical
impact rule).
87. Marrs, supra note 75, at 1. At the present time, only Colorado (King v. Burris, 588 F.
Supp. 1152 (D. Colo. 1984)), Georgia (OB-Gyn Assocs. of Albany v. Littleton, 386 S.E.2d 146
(Ga. 1989)), Illinois (Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F. Supp. 1553 (N.D. Ill. 1983)),
Indiana (Cullison v. Medley, 570 N.E.2d 27 (Ind. 1991)), and Kansas (Anderson V. Scheffler, 752
P.2d 667 (Kan. 1988)) still adhere to the physical impact rule out of fear that abandoning it will lead
to fraudulent claims.
88. There is great disparity among the jurisdictions' definitions of what constitutes a physical
manifestation; consequently, the rule has lost its effectiveness. Herring, supra note 76, at 499. See,
e.g., Cosgrovev. Beymer, 244 F. Supp. 824, 826 (D. Del. 1965) (acknowledgingthat, in Delaware,
dizziness, mild headaches, and nervousness did not constitute physical manifestation). But see
Bowman v. Williams, 165 A. 182, 184 (Md. 1933) (holding that weakness and nervousness did
constitute a physical manifestation); Espinosa v. Beverly Hosp., 249 P.2d 843, 845 (Cal. 1952)
(holding that loss of sleep was not a physical manifestation). But see Vance v. Vance, 408 A.2d
728, 734 (Md. 1979) (holding that insomnia was a physical manifestation); Burns v. Jaquays Mining
Corp., 752 P.2d 28, 31 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that sleep disorders, manifestations of anger,
headaches, personality disorders, sexual dysfunction, and other adverse health effects were not
sufficient physical manifestations of emotional distress); Allen v. Otis Elevator Co., 563 N.E.2d
826, 833-34 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that nervousness did not constitute a physical
manifestation). But see Daley v. LaCroix, 179 N.W.2d 390, 396 (Mich. 1970) (holding that claims
of nervousness may satisfy the physical manifestation requirement). The physical manifestation
requirement encourages extravagant pleading because it is difficult to foresee what injuries a court
will deem physical and consequently, recoverable. Herring, supra note 76, at 499. Therefore, the
lawyer's creativity played an important part in the litigation because "in most instances of severe
mental disturbance some deleterious physical consequence can, with a little ingenuity, be found..
• ." W.E. Shipley, Annotation Comment Note-Right to Recoverfor Emotional Disturbance or its
Physical Consequences, in the Absence of Impact or Other Actionable Wrong, 64 A.L.R.2D 100,
117 n.18 (1959).
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Although most courts still require physical manifestation of emotional
distress," some courts have abolished physical manifestations as a requirement
for negligent infliction of emotional distress.' As with the physical impact
rule, the solution to the inconsistent case law is to simply abolish the physical
manifestation rule and recognize pure psychic emotional distress claims.91
B. Pure Psychic Claims of Emotional Distress
The common justification among the states that have abandoned the
physical manifestation rule is that it is outdated and ridiculous in the face of
advancements by medical science and psychology regarding the recognition and
diagnosis of mental injury.' These states criticize the physical manifestation
rule as over-inclusive because it can lead to recovery for trivial claims merely
because they are accompanied by physical symptoms. 93 At the same time, the
89. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
90. Marrs, supra note 75, at 2. The 14 states that have abolished the physical manifestations
requirement are: Alabama, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, and Washington. Id.
91. See Darby, supra note 22, at 200. Darby does not advocate the abandonment of the
physical injury rule, but instead, he suggests a solution to easily satisfy the rule. Id. By following
the reasoning espoused in fear of cancer cases, Darby argues that a reasonable and genuine fear of
AIDS is a present injury, and therefore, the physical injury rule is satisfied. Id. This solution is
logical and a step in the right direction to alleviate the rigidity of the physical injury rule, but it
would be more logical to just abandon the nile because a mental injury is not physical and should
not be treated as such. It is illogical to stretch the rule to merely circumvent it; instead, the rule
should be abandoned because it is outdated. See infra notes 92-104 (analyzing why the physical
manifestation rule should be abandoned). See also Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress:
The Case for an Independent Tort, 59 GEO. L.J. 1237, 1248-63 (1971) (illustrating that the physical
impact and physical manifestation rules are arbitrary and unnecessary because of the advancements
of modern science); Bell, supra note 60, at 333-40, 412 (arguing that the physical impact and
physical manifestation rules should be abandoned in favor of full recovery for psychic injury);
Frances L. Edwards & Al H. Ringleb, Exposure to Hazardous Substances and the Mental Distress
Tort: Trends, Applications, and a Proposed Reform, 11 COLUM. J. ENVrL. L. 119, 122, 126-38
(1986) (arguing that it is illogical to maintain the physical impact and physical manifestation rules,
given that the rules are no longer consistently applied). But see Brown, supra note 63, at 367
(arguing that the solution to inconsistent case law is to keep the physical manifestation rule, but
make its application consistent).
92. See Taylor v. Baptist Medical Ctr., Inc., 400 So. 2d 369, 374 (Ala. 1981) (reasoning that
'to continue to require physical injury caused by culpable tortious conduct, when mental suffering
may be equally recognizable standing alone, would be an adherence to procrustean principles which
have little or no resemblance to medical realities'); see also Edwards & Ringleb, supra note 91, at
133-38 (exposing the physical injury requirement as unnecessary in light of medical advancements);
Herring, supra note 76, at 487 (presenting evidence of medical science's ability to determine
whether mental suffering is legitimate).
93. James v. Lieb, 375 N.W.2d 109, 116 (Neb. 1985). The court reasoned that the physical
manifestations requirement is flawed because '[ilt encourages extravagant pleadings and distorted
testimony- and is unnecessary given the current understanding of psychological injuries in medical
science and psychology. Id.
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physical manifestation rule is under-inclusive because serious claims are rejected
if they are not accompanied by physical symptoms."
Jurisdictions retain the physical manifestation rule because they fear its
absence will lead to a flood of fraudulent claims. However, advancements in
medical science and psychology now enable experts, to distinguish fraudulent
claims from legitimate claims." In addition to the ability of experts to
94. Id. The court reasoned that the physical manifestation rule is "under inclusive, since
serious distress is arbitrarily deemed not compensable if not accompanied by physical symptoms."
Id.
95. "The study of psychiatry is now an integral and respected part of medical science."
Leibson, supra note 73, at 164. See Hagerty v. L & L Marine Serva., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 318 (6th
Cir. 1988) (holding that plaintiffs do not have to allege a contemporaneous physical injury, but
instead must only plead that the emotional distress is "reasonably and causally related to the
plaintiff's negligence"). See also Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 519-20 (1970) (holding that in
evaluating the genuineness of plaintiffs' claims, 'courts and juries may look to the quality and
genuineness of proof and rely to an extent on the contemporary sophistication of the medical
profession and the ability of the court and jury to weed out dishonest claims"); Corgan v. Muehling,
574 N.E.2d 602, 608-09 (IIl. 1991) (holding that pure psychic emotional injury claims are legitimate
given science's ability to judge the claim's merit); Gammon v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Maine, Inc.,
534 A.2d 1282, 1285 (Me. 1987) (reasoning that "[t]he analysis of commentators and the developing
trend in case law encourage us to abandon these artificial devices [the physical manifestation
requirement] in this and future tort actions and to rely upon the trial process for protection against
fraudulent claims"); Zelinaky v. Chimics, 175 A.2d 351, 354 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1961) (holding that
the expert witness's testimony that the plaintiff's neurosis was caused by an automobile accident was
sufficient proof of emotional distress); Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 447 N.E.2d 109, 112 (Ohio
1983) (holding that the physical manifestation rule is unjust and contrary to experience); Sinn v.
Burd, 404 A.2d 672, 678-79 (Pa. 1979) (holding that medical science could establish a causal link
between psychic injury and the plaintiff's viewing of a grisly accident). See also St. Elizabeth Hop.
v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 654 (rex. 1987) (holding that the distinction between physical injury
and emotional distress is no longer valid). The court in St. Elizabeth reasoned:
The problem is one of proof, and to deny a remedy in all cases because some claims
may be false leads to arbitrary results which do not serve the best interests of the public.
Jurors are best suited to determine whether and to what extent the defendant's conduct
caused compensable mental anguish by referring to their own experience.
Id. See also Calvert Magruder, Menta and Emodonal Disturbance in the Law of Tors, 49 HARV.
L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1936) (arguing that courts have the ability to redress infliction of mental pain).
"Mental suffering is no more difficult to estimate in financial terms, and no less a real injury,
than 'physical' pain .... " KEIETON ET AL., supra note 61, at 360. See genera//y Dworkin, supra
note 58 (arguing that juries possess the ability to assess emotional injuries); Davies, supra note 76,
at 13 (analyzing the various methods employed by courts to determine whether the plaintiff's
emotional distress is legitimate); Daley v. LaCroix, 179 N.W.2d 390, 396 (Mich. 1970) (illustrating
the different tests that physicians can use to determine emotional distress and its cause); Devlin v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 495 A.2d 495, 497 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (recognizing that
emotional distress is as real as physical pain and therefore, its estimation is not more difficult than
physical pain).
After interviewing the plaintiff about the emotional distress, physicians have a variety of
methods to distinguish fraudulent claims from those that are legitimate. Comment, supra note 91,
at 1248-53, 1258-62. '[Medical science is capable of satisfactorily establishing the existence,
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determine the legitimacy of the plaintiff's emotional distress, the circumstances
surrounding the incident which caused the plaintiff's fear can supply a sufficient
guarantee of the genuineness of the plaintiff's emotional distress.9 Therefore,
the courts can evaluate the circumstances that caused the plaintiff's emotional
distress and determine whether a reasonable person would also suffer emotional
distress.'
Psychic injuries are already recognized in a variety of non-parasitic
situations, including the intentional torts of invasion of privacy' and false
imprisonment," as well as in workers' compensation cases. ' Therefore,
seriousness, and ramifications of emotional harm.' Id. at 1253. See also Edwards & Ringleb,
supra note 91, at 133-38 (asserting that medical science is able to establish the magnitude of the
plaintiff's emotional injury); Herbert F. Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20
MIcH. L. Riv. 497, 513 (1922) (concluding that although medical science may help the courts with
facts about human emotions, the legal effects of the facts are ultimately based on rles of policy
established by the courts and legislatures); Moses Keschner, Simulation of Nervous and Mental
Disease, 44 MIcH. L. REv. 715 (1946) (analyzing the tests employed in determining whether a
plaintiff's emotional distress is legitimate); Paul D. Rheingold, The Basis of Medical Tesuimony, 15
VAND. L. REV. 473, 482-48 (1962) (arguing that physicians should be allowed to freely rely upon
medical material that they believe is crucial to the opinion they are asked to offer); Hubert Winston
Smith, Cross-Examinalon of Neurop-ychlatric Testimony in Personal Injury Cases, 4 VAND. L.
Rnrv. 1, 61-62 (1950) (providing a rationale to test expert medical testimony in emotional distress
claims).
96. Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servo., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 1986), affd on
reconsideration, 797 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986). The Hagerty court reasoned:
The physical [manifestation) requirement, like its counterpart, the physical impact
requirement, was developed to provide courts with an objective means of ensuring that
the alleged mental injury is not feigned. We believe that notion to be unrealistic. It is
doubtful that the trier of fact is any less able to decide the fact or extent of mental
suffering in the event of physical [manifestation] or impact.
Id. at 318 (citations omitted).
By combining the plaintiff's testimony and the context in which the plaintiff's trauma occurred
with knowledge of the amount of emotional harm likely to result from such a trauma, a psychiatrist
can determine whether the plaintiff's emotional distress is legitimate. Comment, supra note 91, at
1252.
97. See, e.g., Hagery, 788 F.2d at 318; Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (Haw. 1970);
Alevizos v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 216 N.W.2d 651, 662 (Minn. 1974) (requiring the
plaintiffs to prove that a reasonable person would have suffered emotional distress from the
defendant's actions).
98. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Hampton v. Morrissey, 1993
WL 358209 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1993); Guthridge v. Pen-Mod, Inc., 239 A.2d 709 (Del. Super. Ct.
1967); Macon Tel. Pub. Co. v. Tatum, 436 S.E.2d 655 (Ga. 1993) (illustrating that there is no
requirement under the tort of invasion of privacy that the plaintiff's emotional distress manifest itself
physically).
99. See, e.g., Altman v. Knox Lumber Co., 381 N.W.2d 858, 863-65 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986);
K-Mart Corp. v. Washington, 866 P.2d 274, 285 (Nev. 1993); Fields v. Victory Chain Store, Inc.,
300 N.Y.S.2d 688 (1969); Bean v. Best, 93 N.W.2d 403, 407-09 (S.D. 1958); Lane v. Collins, 138
N.W.2d 264, 268-70 (Wis. 1965) (illustrating that physical manifestation of the plaintiff's emotional
distress was not required in false imprisonment claims).
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if the courts are able to evaluate emotional distress claims in these situations,
they should be able to evaluate emotional distress claims in any non-parasitic
situations.' The HIV-fear cases are psychological claims and must be
viewed in light of the various ways that states have dealt with other
psychological torts." The same limitations imposed in other emotional
distress claims"rs threaten to stifle the claims of plaintiffs legitimately injured
in HIV-fear cases solely because their emotional distress is not attached to, or
manifested in, physical injuries.'
III. THE NEW FRONTIER-RECOVERY FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
IN HIV-FEAR CASES
The HIV-fear cases appeared in the midst of a debate over fear of illness
cases."°5 According to commentators, the risk of exposure to toxic substances
has become the most significant health issue of the century." Courts
generally recognize emotional distress that is caused by a fear of developing an
100. Bell, supra note 60, at 407-08. See Todd v. Goostree, 493 S.W.2d 411,420-21 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1973), affrd, 528 S.W.2d 470 (1975) (allowing an employee's recovery for severe anxiety
resulting from the discovery of a co-worker's crushed body); Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Cur, Co.,
330 N.E.2d 603, 606-07 (N.Y. 1975) (allowing workers' compensation for depression caused by
the employee's discovery of boss after his suicide). Although these cases were brought under the
rules of workers' compensation rather than the general tort compensation system, they are important
because they illustrate that "one significant branch of compensation law in this country rejects some
of the arguments that are advanced to bar full recognition of psychic injury in the courts." Bell,
supra note 60, at 408 n.309.
101. Bell, supranote 60, at 92-104.
102. See supra notes 86-100 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 71-76, 86-94 and accompanying text.
104. See infra note 119 and accompanying text (describing cases denying compensation to
plaintiffs who were legitimately injured in HIV-fear cases because they did not satisfy either the
physical impact or the physical manifestation rule). See infra notes 116-30 and accompanying text
(examining the imposition of the physical impact and physical manifestation rules to HIV-fear
claims).
105. See generally Brian R. Garves, Fear of AIDS, 3 J. PHARM. & L. 29 (1994) (providing an
overview of HIV-fear cases); Lauren J. Camillo, Comment, Adding Fuel to the Fire: Realistic Fears
or Unrealistic Damages in AIDS Phobia Suits, 35 TEX. L. REV. 331 (1994) (presenting a legal
analysis of Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993)); Kevin B. Flynn, Marchica v. Long Island
RR: AIDS Phobia as a Cause of Action Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 3 J. PHARM.
& L. 217 (1994) (analyzing the court's holding and reasoning in the Marchica case).
106. Richard H. Krochok &Mark A. Solheim, Psychological Damages from Toxic Substances:
Problems and Solutions, 60 DEF. COUNS. J. 80, 80 (1993).
It is difficult to go a week without news of toxic exposure. Virtually everyone in
society is conscious of the fact that the air they breathe, [the] water, food and drugs they
ingest, [the] land on which they live, or [the] products to which they are exposed are
potential health hazards. Although few are exposed to all, few also can escape exposure
to any.
Id. at 81.
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illness after potential exposure to a toxic substance. 7  Courts readily
recognize claims based on fear of cancer,"~ but are more skeptical about
allowing recovery for fear of other diseases, such as HIV. 07
In a 1993 decision," ° the Superior Court of Pennsylvania ignored the true
basis of a fear-of-illness claim based upon potential exposure to HIV. The court
held that emotional distress recovery will only be allowed if the plaintiff
eventually tests positive for HIV, reasoning that only existing diseases are
compensable."' The court's rejection of the plaintiffs claim completely
ignores the purpose of HIV-fear suits, which is recovery for the plaintiffs' fear
during the time period in which they do not know whether they have been
101. See Marrs, supra note 75, at 2 (thoroughly analyzing the leading fear-of-illness cases of
each state). See genera//y Brown, supra note 63 (analyzing the recognition of claims based upon
a fear of developing a future illness); Whiteman, supra note 59 (analyzing the history of toxic
emotional distress claims); Krochock & Solheim, supra note 106, at 80 (analyzing the fear-of-illness
case law in all 50 states); Bill Charles Well, The Grin Without the Cat: Claims for Damages from
Toxic Exposure Without Present Injury, 18 Wm. & MARY J. ENlrL. L. 285 (1994) (analyzing the
evolution of toxic torts, medical monitoring, fear of future disease claims, and claims for increased
risk of future disease).
108. See Smith v. A. C. & S., Inc., 843 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that plaintiffs may
recover for their fear of developing cancer if they present evidence of their fear of developing
cancerousconditiona in the future); Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 495 A.2d 495, 499 (N.J. 1985)
(holding that plaintiffs can recover for their fear of developing cancer if the plaintiffs' fears are
reasonable, proximately caused by exposure to a carcinogen (here asbestos), and the defendants were
legally responsible for the plaintiffs' exposure to the carcinogen); NC-Alley v. Charlotte Pipe &
Foundry Co., 74 S.E. 885, 886 (N.C. 1912) (recognizing that the fear of cancer is a present injury
of mental anxiety and distress); Lavelle v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas, 507 N.E.2d 476, 478, 480-81
(Ohio Comm. Pl. 1987) (holding that neither physical impact nor physical manifestation are required
to recover for fear of cancer); Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., 639 S.W.2d 431, 434
(Tenn. 1982) (holding that the plaintiffs could recover for their fear of developing cancer because
drinking contaminated water constituted a physical injury).
. 109. JACOB A. STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL DAMAGES 77-78 (2d ed. 1991). Courts are
skeptical of allowing recovery in HIV cases because of the social stigmas and phobias surrounding
the disease. Garves, supra note 32, at 30-32. Despite the fact that HIV now affects both sexes and
all races and is not solely transmitted through sexual activity, many in society view HIV as a disease
that only plagues homosexuals or sexually promiscuous individuals. Braden, supra note 12, at 278.
In fact, most people are confident that they will never test positive for the disease. RANDY SHILTS,
AND THE BAND PLAYED ON: POLITICS, PEOPLE, AND THE AIDS EPIDEMIC 589 (1987).
110. Lubowitz v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 623 A.2d 3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
111. Id. at 5. The court held that if "Robyn Lubowitz eventually were to contract AIDS as the
result of the events outlined in this case, she would have a cause of action for a compensable injury
at that time." Id. Therefore, in Pennsylvania, plaintiffs can only recover compensation for diseases
that presently exist or existed at or before the time of trial. Id. See also J.B. v. Bohonovsky, 835
F. Supp. 796, 800 (D. NJ. 1993) (holding that "in the absence of any indicia that the plaintiff is
actually infected [with HIV], the court concludes that the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the
[defendant's] conduct caused him any physical injury").
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exposed to HIV."' Critics of ILV-fear claims argue that the claims will
merely increase litigation for an already over-burdened judiciary." 3 Although
recognition of the claims could increase litigation, this is not a legitimate
argument to deny recovery to injured plaintiffs, because the courts were created
to dispense justice and not merely to promote judicial efficiency." 4
Currently, confusion exists among the courts in fear-of-illness cases as to
whether plaintiffs should be allowed to recover for their fear of future illness in
the absence of any physical injury' and regardless of whether they develop
the disease." Unfortunately, because of the confusion, the HIV-fear cases
have been limited by the archaic rules present in other emotional distress
claims."' As in other emotional distress claims,"8 courts attempt to restrict
liability and insure legitimate claims by requiring a physical injury through
either a physical impact"9  that accompanies the fear or a physical
112. Skiver, supra note 5, at 844. See, e.g., Tischler v. Dimenna, 609 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1009
(N.Y. 1994) (holding that although the plaintiff tested negative for HIV on three separate occasions,
she established a prima facie case of emotional distress from possible exposure to HIV against her
former boyfriend who had died from AIDS and with whom she had engaged in unprotected sex from
1980 until 1989).
113. Goldberg, supra note 30, at 88.
114. Smith, supra note 56, at 193, 197; Comment, supra note 91, at 1245 (arguing that the
courts' continual arguments about the flood of litigation that will occur and the inability to filter out
false claims illustrate the 'arbitrariness of public policy decisions and raise questions concerning the
wisdom of cutting off liability on a per se basis"). See also Meton E. Marks & James T. Acuff,
Jr., Legal Issues in the Recovery for Fear of Funwe Disease Without Present Physical Injury, FED.
INS. C.C.Q., Winter 1991, at 239 (disclaiming the various arguments by courts that expanded
recovery in fear-of-illnew cases will overwhelm the courts with fraudulent claims).
115. John R. Allison, Eidence Supporng Recoverable Damages for Potential Disease, 24
TORT & INS. LJ. 39 (1988). The courts are split over whether a plaintiff must suffer a physical
harm (either impact or manifestation) in order to recover for damages for a potential disease. The
arguments are repetitious of the arguments made in negligent infliction of emotional distress claims.
G. Marc Whitehead & Larry D. Espel, Damages for Speculative Toxic Tort Consequences?: Wait
and See, in 363 PRACTIC[NG L. INst. Lrro. J 443-46 (Practicing Law Inst. 1988). See also Adam
P. Rosen, Comment, Emotional Distress Damages in Toxic Tort Litgaion: The Move Towards
Foreseeability, 3 VL.. ENvTL. LJ. 113, 117 (1992) (arguing that a foreseeability analysis in fear-
of-illness claims provides redress for plaintiffs and deters the negligent management of toxic
hazards). See also supra notes 86-100 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 73-91 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 73-91 and accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., Doe v. Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1987), where the wife claimed emotional
distress from the fear that she had been exposed to HIV by her husband who had, without her
knowledge, engaged in homosexual activity. Id. at 597. The court dismissed the wife's claim as
too tenuous because she did not allege that either she or her husband had contracted IV, and
therefore she did not satisfy the jurisdiction's physical injury requirement. Id. Since the Doe case,
the courts have witnessed an emergence of HIV-fear cases and have adopted various standards of
recovery. See, e.g., Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 810 F. Supp. 445, 449 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
(holding that a puncture wound from a hypodermic needle satisfied the jurisdiction's physical injury
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manifestation of the fear."2 The result is diverse approaches in fear-of-illness
rule); Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 695, 697 (1991) (holding that a cleaning
worker's puncture from a hypodermic needle in a waste container at an insurance office constituted
a physical injury); Burk v. Sage Products, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285, 287 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding
that absent an injury stemming from his alleged exposure to HIV, a paramedic who was stuck by
a needle protruding from a disposal container of used medical syringes could not recover damages
for his fear of HIV). See also Johnson v. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889, 891
(W. Va. 1991), in which a hospital patient who was suffering from AIDS bit his own arm and then,
with his own blood in his mouth, bit the plaintiff, a security officer, on the arm. The plaintiff sued
for emotional distress based on his fear that he had been exposed to H1V/AIDS, and the court held
that the bite on the plaintiff's arm satisfied the physical impact rule. See also Doe v. Surgicare of
Joliet, Inc., 643 N.E.2d 1200, 1202 (I1. App. Ct. 1994) (holding that a needle stick satisfied the
jurisdiction's physical impact requirement but ultimately holding that the plaintiff's claim was too
speculative to allow recovery). See supra notes 73-87 and accompanying text (analyzing the physical
impact rule).
120. STEIN, supra note 109, at 79. See Poole v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 698 F. Supp. 1367,
1372 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that the wife of a hemophiliac who contracted AIDS through
contaminated blood sufficiently established that she was in the zone of danger, but failed to allege
any physical injury or illness resulting from her emotional distress); In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos
Cases, 734 F. Supp. 1563, 1570 (D. Hawaii 1990) (holding that a compensable physical harm must
exist that accompanies the fear of illness based on toxic exposure); Ordway v. County of Suffolk,
583 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1016 (1992) (holding that because the plaintiff stated only that he lived in fear
that he contracted HIV and did not allege any physical manifestations of his fear, the plaintiff's
allegations of subsequent injury did not give a guarantee of genuineness); Rittenhouse v. St. Regis
Hotel Joint Venture, 579 N.Y.S.2d 100, 101 (1992) (holding that the plaintiff could not recover
because she had not demonstrated any physical manifestation of the emotional distress of being
exposed to asbestos); Ball v. Joy Technologies, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 1344, 1367 (S.D. W.Va. 1990)
(holding that under West Virginia law, mere exposure to a toxic substance is not enough to support
a claim for emotional distress). See also Arvin Maskin & Peter A. Antonucci, Overview and Update
of Emerging Damage Theories in Toxic Tort Litigation, C837 ALI-ABA 629, 650-657 (1993)
(discussing cases that illustrate the practice of only allowing recovery where there is a physical
impact or physical manifestation).
Some courts have found the existence of physical manifestation. See, e.g., M.M.H. v. United
States, 966 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1992). While in the Army, the plaintiff was notified that she was
HIV positive and was not notified to the contrary when it was discovered two months later that she
did not have HIV. The court held that the plaintiff's sleeplessness, diarrhea, and suicide attempts
after notification that she had HIV satisfied the physical manifestation requirement. Id. at .287; See
also Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 338 (Md. 1993) (holding that the plaintiffs' headaches and
sleeplessness were physical manifestations of emotional distress); Howard v. Alexandria Hospital,
429 S.E.2d 22, 23 (Va. 1993). After surgery, the plaintiff was advised by her surgeon that there
was a possibility that unsterile instruments had been used during her operation, and the surgeon was
afraid that the plaintiff could develop HIV and other infectious diseases. The court held that,
although the plaintiff did not sustain an injury as a result of infection from such injuries, she was
forced to undergo treatments of pain shots every four to six hours that caused her migraine
headaches, nausea, and vomiting and therefore had suffered physical manifestations. Howard, 429
S.E. 2d at 25. See also Edward Benedict Lumpkin, Note, Recovery of Emoional Distress Damages
in AIDS-Phobia Cases: A Suggested Approach for Virginia, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 717 (1994)
(arguing that Virginia's requirement of physical manifestations and proximate cause through clear
and convincing evidence should be maintained to insure the genuineness of plaintiff's claims). See
generally Harry H. Lipsig, AIDS Phobia and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, N.Y. LJ.,
Mar. 26, 1992, at 3 (analyzing the physical manifestation requirement in HIV-fear cases).
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cases because some courts treat the exposure as a form of physical impact.'2'
Just as in other emotional distress claims," the physical injury
requirement in fear-of-illness cases reflects the proposition that physical security
is valued more than emotional security in tort law."' The reality is that
emotional security is valid and deserves the same respect as physical
security.' 2' Individuals have the right to physical and mental tranquility
because both are important to human existence."z  Therefore, many courts
recognize pure psychic emotional claims by holding that exposure alone is a
sufficient basis for recovery.126
121. Krochock & Solheim, supra note 106, at 105-10. See Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1137 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that the inhalation of asbestos fibers was a
physical impact); Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 83 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that a
physical injury that resulted from the plaintiff's fear of cancer was not required, but instead that the
infiltration of asbestos fibers into the plaintiff's lungs was a physical impact); Laxton v. Orkin
Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tenn. 1982) (holding that the plaintiff's ingestion of
water contaminated with toxic chemicals constituted a physical impact). See also Maskin &
Antonucci, supra note 120, at 629, 657-59 (analyzing cases in which courts have held that exposure
to a toxic substance is a sufficient physical impact or physical injury).
122. See supra notes 73-91 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 55-76, 86-91 and accompanying text.
124. See Comment, supra note 91, at 1263 (arguing that mental injuries are real and should be
recompensed); Bell, supra note 60, at 314 (arguing that individuals have the right to freedom of
mental tranquility).
125. Bell, supra note 60, at 341. See also Cornelius J. Peck, Compensation for Pain: A
Reappraisal in Light of New Medical Evidence, 72 MicH. L. REv. 1355, 1386-95 (1974) (arguing
that both physical and emotional pain are compensable); David J. Leibson, supra note 73, at 164
(concluding that emotional injuries are legitimate and deserve compensation).
126. The jurisdictions have adopted either all or part of the following principles:
(1) The plaintiff must establish the elements of a prima facie case for negligence, (2)
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress is an independent cause of action, (3) the fear
of future disease is a type of compensable emotional distress, (4) the plaintiff must
establish proof of exposure to the toxic substance, (5) the emotional distress must be
serious, (6) the plaintiff's claim must be for fear of a specific disease and not just a fear
for the plaintiff's general health, (7) the fear of illness must be reasonable, (8) the
plaintiff may enter evidence of the plaintiff's likelihood of developing the illness to
illustrate the reasonableness of the plaintiff's fear, and (9) it must be reasonably
foreseeable that the conduct would cause severe emotional distress in the plaintiff.
Marrs, supra note 75, at 2. See generally Krochock & Solheim, supra note 106 (analyzing the
jurisdictions that recognize pure psychic claims for emotional distress).
See Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1199 (6th Cir. 1988) (recognizing
that the plaintiff's fear of contracting cancer as a result of ingesting water contaminated by the
chemical corporation without anything more was enough to maintain a claim for emotional distress);
Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that a seaman
who was doused with toxic chemicals may proceed with his claim with or without physical impact
or physical manifestations because his fear was reasonable and causally related to the defendant's
negligence); Marriott v. Sedco Forex Int'l Resources, 827 F. Supp. 59, 75 (D. Mass. 1993) (holding
that plaintiffs who were inoculated with a vaccine that tested positive for HIV could recover for their
fear of developing HIV absent physical manifestations); Merry v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., No.
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The courts that continue to retain the physical injury requirement in fear-of-
illness cases represent a tradition of denying full recovery for emotional injury
in all tort categories." = Although the debates over the retention of the
physical impact" and physical manifestation rules' " play an important part
in the HIV-fear cases, currently the greatest focus is upon whether the plaintiff
should be required to prove the actual channel of exposure."3
A. The Debate Over the Channel of Exposure
Adding to the complexity of the HIV-fear cases is the current debate over
whether a plaintiff should be required to prove the actual channel of potential
HIV exposure, meaning the exact means by which HIV exposure potentially
occurred.' 3 ' In their struggle to avoid the overly anticipated flood of HIV-fear
cases, some courts have established an additional barrier separate from the
physical injury and physical manifestation rules that requires the plaintiff to
prove the actual channel of HIV exposure." Requiring proof of actual
86-1673, slip op. (M.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 1988) (holding that the plaintiffs could recover for their fear
of illness from contaminated water in their wells even absent medical evidence that they had retained
any chemicals in their bodies); Maskin & Antonucci, supra note 120, at 629 (discussing other cases
where the courts have held that exposure alone is sufficient for recovery).
See also Whiteman, supra note 59, at 1005, 1013-14 (arguing that both the physical
requirements should be abandoned in favor of a reasonable fear test in fear of cancer cases). Under
Whiteman's proposed test, plaintiffs must prove that their fear is specific, reasonable, serious,
causally related to and a foreseeable result of the defendant's negligence, and that cancer may result
from the toxic exposure. Id.
See also Kaufman v. Physical Measurements, Inc., 615 N.Y.S.2d 508, 509 (N.Y. App. Div.
1994) (holding that New York does recognize pure psychic emotional claims but that the plaintiff
who was accidentally pricked by a needle had no medical evidence to support his claim of exposure
to HIV, for both the needle and the individual whose blood was in the needle tested negative for
HIV).
127. Jane E. Larson, 'Women Understand So Liule, 7hey Call My Good Nature 'Deceit": A
Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 460 (1993).
128. See supra notes 73-86 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 64-68, 73-75, 87-90, 94-96 and accompanying text.
130. Garves, supra note 32, at 30.
131. Two categories of cases exist because the alleged contact is either too tenuous to establish
potential exposure, or is sufficient to establish that something occurred that might constitute
exposure. Goldberg, supra note 30, at 90.
132. See Doe v. Surgicare of Joliet, Inc., 643 N.E. 2d 1200, 1203-04 (M11. App. Ct. 1994)
(holding that the plaintiff must allege and prove actual exposure to HIV and that recovery should
be based upon the likelihood of contracting the disease and not the fear that exposure could have
happened, but did not); Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 881, 888 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993) (holding that proof
of actual exposure is required to recover for fear of HIV exposure); Seimon v. Becton Dickinson
& Co., 632 N.E.2d 603, 605 (Ohio App. Ct. 1993) (holding that absent proof of actual exposure
to HIV, the plaintiffs could not recover); Burk v. Sage Products, 747 F. Supp. 285, 288 (E.D. Pa.
1990) (holding that fear of exposure to HIV was not a compensable injury because the plaintiff could
not prove actual exposure to HIV); Gregory, Inc. v. Bluefield Community Hospital, 413 S.E.2d 79
(W. Va. 1991) (holding that absent proof of actual exposure to HIV, the plaintiff's fear was
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exposure reassures the court that the emotional distress is not fraudulent by
providing tangible proof that justifies the plaintiff's fear of developing IV. '"
The social and economic stigmas surrounding the HIV-fear cases merely
reinforce the idea that emotional distress claims are somehow not as
compensable as claims for physical ailments."' The requirement of proof of
the actual channel of exposure creates legitimacy for the courts that the
plaintiff's fear is reasonable, justifiable, and therefore, compensable." The
reality, however, is that counterfeit HIV claims based on erroneous beliefs of
HIV transmission already exist."
For example, in Johnetta v. Municipal Court,13 7 the court ordered the
defendant to submit to AIDS blood testing after the defendant bit a sheriff's
deputy." 8 The trial court found no evidence that the bite transferred any
blood to the deputy.139 Therefore, the defendant's saliva contained the only
unreasonable and not legally compensable).
133. Proof of exposure has consistently been the plaintiff's greatest burden in HIV-fear cases.
Garves, supra note 32, at 27.
134. The reality is that the "law is not for the protection of the physically sound alone.'
KEETON ET AL., supra note 61, at 360.
135. Debbie E. Lanin, Note, 7he Fear of Disease As a Compensable Injury: An Analysis of
Clms Based on AIDS Phobia, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 77 (1993) (arguing that proof of actual
exposure is a decisive element of the plaintiff's fear of AIDS claim, and abandonment of this
requirement would lead to a flood of cases based on unsubstantiated fears of developing AIDS);
James E. Maroulis, Can HIV-Negadve Plainiffs RecoverEmnotionalDistress Danagesfor Their Fear
of AIDS?, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 225, 263 (1993) (arguing that proof of the actual channel of
exposure is the only means available to validate the plaintiff's claims); Harris J. Zakarin, Scared to
Death: A Cause of Acdon for AIDS Phobia, 10 TouRo L. RBv. 263, 273 (1993) (analyzing New
York H1V-fear cases and concluding that plaintiffs must show actual exposure to HIV).
136. See infra notes 137-50 and accompanying text. See also Weeks v. State, 834 S.W.2d 559
(1992), in which the defendant, a prison inmate, twice spit upon a prison guard's face. At the time
of the incident, the defendant was HIV-positive. The first medical expert testified that "[i]f [HIV)
was transmitted by casual contact with saliva or with kissing, we would have many more
documented cases than we do now .... We would have seen an explosion outside the risk group,
which has not happened." Id. at 564. The court chose to ignore the first expert's testimony and
relied upon another medical expert who testified that there had been a case where an elderly couple
allegedly only engaged in kissing and HIV transmission occurred. Id. at 563. Despite contradictory
medical testimony that it is almost impossible to get all relevant information about sexual practices
and conduct and that the case is not "precedent for transmission in general," the court held that there
was sufficient evidence to support the finding that the defendant could have transmitted HIV to the
prison guard through his saliva. Id. at 565.
137. 267 Cal. Rptr. 666 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 670. "There was no blood in the mouth of the defendant at the time; but certainly
saliva was transferred." Id. at 669.
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possible transfer agent of HIV. 4 Despite expert medical testimony that HIV
cannot be transferred through saliva that does not contain HIV-infected blood,
the California Court of Appeals held that it was reasonable to require the
defendant to undergo an HIV test. 1  The court reasoned that a theoretical
possibility existed that HIV transmission could occur through mere saliva; and
therefore, it was reasonable to test for HIV. "
The Johnetta case is dangerous, for it opens doors to claims of HIV
exposure that are too tenuous and that are not recogmzed by HIV
researchers.143 By requiring defendants to undergo HIV tests when no blood-
to-blood exposure occurs, the court condones cases based upon erroneous beliefs
of HIV transmission.
In a similar case, Syring v. Tucker,'" the court also required the
defendant who bit the plaintiff to undergo HIV testing."4s The court agreed
with the Johnetta court, 146 reasoning that there is a theoretical possibility that
HIV could be transmitted through saliva. 47  By allowing claims such as
140. Id. The court accepted the observations of medical experts that none of the defendant's
blood entered the plaintiff's bloodstream. Id. at 670.
141. Id. at 685. The court based its decision upon medical testimony that all bodily fluids of
an HIV-infected individual have a concentration of HIV, and even though saliva has a low HIV-
concentration, it could possibly transmit the disease. Id. at 670. But see supra note 6 (explaining
that saliva which does not contain HIV-infected blood does not possess enough concentration of HIV
for possible transmission).
142. Johneaa v. Municipal Court, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666, 674 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). The court
reached its conclusion by discounting the testimony of the majority of experts who stated that,
'Researchers have found HIV in saliva in low concentrations, but these low concentrations, together
with the studies described above and the absence of a single documented case of transmission are
strong evidence that HIV cannot be transmitted through saliva." Id. at 670.
143. Although there is much about the disease that medical experts do not know, HIV
researchers assert that HIV cannot be transmitted through casual contact or saliva that does not
contain HIV-infected blood. Therefore, HlV-infected blood must be present in the saliva. See supra
note 6 (describing the HIV transmission case of two sisters). One of the possible modes of
transmission was a shared toothbrush because the HIV-infected sister had bleeding gums. Therefore,
the HIV-infected blood possibly came in contact with the younger girl's blood through her own gums
which may have had lesions from rough brushing. The older girl's saliva contained her HIV-
infected blood, but the mode of transmission was still blood-to-blood exposure, and not mere saliva.
144. 498 N.W.2d 370 (Wis. 1993).
145. Id. at 378. The defendant was a Department of Social Services' (DSS) client who went
to the department's offices for a hearing, became disruptive, and was asked to leave. Id. at 371.
The plaintiff, a DSS employee, attempted to restrain the defendant, and the defendant bit him on the
left forearm. Id. The defendant then yelled at the plaintiff that she had AIDS. Id.
146. Johneua v. Municipal Court, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666, 666 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). See supra
notes 137-43 and accompanying text (analyzing the Johneua decision).
147. Syring v. Tucker, 498 N.W.2d 370, 373 (Wis. 1993). The court acknowledged that "[i]t
may be that the greater weight of current scientific opinion holds that HIV cannot be transmitted via
saliva," but then proceeded to hold that the defendant theoretically transmitted HIV to the plaintiff
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Johnena and Syring, where no blood-to-blood exposure to HIV occurred, the
courts are already perpetuating hysteria about how HIV is transmitted.
Therefore, the argument that abandoning the actual channel of exposure
requirement will open the courts to irrational claims is invalid, because irrational
claims already exist under the standard of recovery that requires the plaintiff to
prove the actual channel of exposure.' 4 No reason exists to maintain a rule
that does not fulfill its function of preventing claims based on erroneous beliefs
that exposure to HIV possibly occurred. 19 Consequently, some courts do not
require the plaintiff to prove the actual channel of HIV exposure."5
In Marriott v. Sedco Forex Int'l Resources,' rather than requiring the
plaintiffs to prove the actual channel of exposure, the court required the
plaintiffs to tie their claim to a distinct event that would cause a reasonable
through her non-HIV-tainted saliva. Id.
148. See supra notes 137-47 and accompanying text. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 846
F.2d 1163, 1164 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that an HIV positive inmate who bit two federal
correctional officers could be convicted of assault with a deadly or dangerous weapon (mouth and
teeth)). The court held that even if the inmate was not HIV positive, the decision would be the
same, reasoning that a bite is an assault with a deadly weapon. Id. The court added that the
reference to HIV in the indictment was "mere surplusage," but by allowing the government to
pursue the theory that the defendant possibly transmitted HIV through saliva, the court affirmed the
erroneous belief that exposure to HIV can occur through saliva that does not carry HIV-infected
blood. Id. But see Hare v. State, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125, 127 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (refusing
recovery for fear of HIV to an x-ray technician who was bitten by an inmate, reasoning that there
was no evidence that the inmate was infected with HIV). However, the Hare court did not address
whether the plaintiff would have a claim for the bite if it were shown that the inmate was HIV
positive. The plaintiff in Hare would be denied recovery under this note's modified distinct event
approach because he would not be able to trace his fear to a distinct event that potentially exposed
him to HIV given that no evidence existed that the inmate was HIV positive. However, the plaintiff
would also be denied recovery under this note's modified distinct event approach even if the inmate
were shown to be HI positive. The inmate's saliva did not contain any blood and transmission of
HIV cannot occur through saliva that does not contain HIV-infected blood. See infra Section IV,
notes 226-52 and accompanying text (discussing this note's modified distinct event approach) and
supra note 6 (discussing the modes of H transmission).
149. Another argument against the actual exposure requirement is that courts which use it are
careless in establishing an AIDS/HIV policy for its jurisdiction. Mandana Shahvari, Comment,
Afraids: Fear of AIDS as a Cause of Acdon, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 769, 803 (1994).
150. See, e.g., Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993); Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
588 N.Y.S.2d 695 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 1991) (abandoning the requirement of proof of the actual channel
of exposure, reasoning that it was an impossible burden). See also Louise Feffer, AIDSphobia, A
New Entity, N.Y.BJ., Feb. 1993, at 14 (discussing the courts that have abandoned the actual
channel requirement).
151. 827 F. Supp. 59 (D. Mass. 1993). In Marriott, the plaintiffs were inoculated against
hepatitis with a vaccine that subsequently tested positive for HIV. Id. at 63. The plaintiffs'
employer notified the plaintiffs about the virus, and the plaintiffs sued for their severe emotional
distress caused by their fear that they would develop H11. The court held that the plaintiffs could
recover for their fear of developing HI absent physical manifestations. Id. at 75.
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person to fear developing HIV. n Therefore, under the reasoning of Marriott,
a plaintiff must allege an injury that stems from exposure to HIV.5 3 Injuries
stemming from a fear of developing the illness after exposure are compensable,
but fear of exposure alone is not compensable.11 Therefore, under Marriott,
plaintiffs can recover for their fear of developing HIV if they show that it is
reasonably probable that they will develop HIV, but cannot recover for their fear
over whether exposure occurred. ' The Marriott court correctly abandoned
the actual exposure rule,"5 but did not address the fact that in most cases the
plaintiff's emotional distress is fear over whether exposure occurred. Most
plaintiffs do not possess the same certainty of actual exposure to HIV that the
plaintiffs possessed in Marriott. 7
In Marriott,15 the plaintiffs did not have the burden of proving that HIV
exposure occurred because their employer notified them that they had been
inoculated with a virus that subsequently tested positive for HIV. 159 Recovery
for plaintiffs' fear after exposure is proven does not account for plaintiffs who
may be unable to prove actual exposure,"° but who legitimately fear that they
152. The Manion court reasoned that there was a sufficient guarantee of genuineness of the
claim so long as plaintiffs tied their claims to a "distinct event which could cause a reasonable
person to develop a fear of developing a disease like AIDS." Id.
153. The court held that '[i]f a claim can be tied to a distinct event which could cause a
reasonable person to develop a fear of contracting a disease like HI, there is a guarantee of
genuineness of the claim.I Id. at 75.
154. Id. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs' claim fell within the group of cases that allow
recovery absent physical manifestation because they traced their fear of developing HIV to a single
traumatic occurrence where they were directly exposed to HIV (the inoculation). Id. at 75-76.
155. Therefore, the plaintiffs must allege a reasonable fear that they have contracted HIV.
Marriott v. Sedco Forex Int'l Resources, 827 F. Supp. 59, 75-76 (D. Mass. 1993). See also
Herbert v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 709, 712 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that
the plaintiff must show that the risk of contracting HI is significant).
156. Manion, 827 F. Supp. at 75 (holding that the plaintiffs must allege a single traumatic
occurrence in which they were exposed to HIV).
157. See supra note 151 (establishing the facts of Marriott).
158. 827 F. Supp. 59 (D. Mass. 1993).
159. Id. at 63.
160. For example, proof of whether exposure actually occurred will be more difficult, if not
impossible, for a plaintiffwho is unconscious during surgery. See Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327,
337 (Md. 1993) (reasoning that to require plaintiffs to "allege actual transmission would unfairly
punish them for lacking the requisite information to do so" because the plaintiffs were unconscious
during their respective surgeries and discovered months later that the physician who performed the
surgery was HIV positive at the time of the surgery). See infra notes 242-50 and accompanying
text, in which this note proposes that Res Ipsa Loquitur should be applied in HIV-fear cases to
plaintiffs who are unable to prove the actual channel of exposure. See also Shahvari, supra note
149, at 804 (arguing that courts must not characterize all plaintiffs as unreasonable AIDS phobics
merely because they cannot prove the actual channel of exposure). Instead, Shahvari proposes that
courts must examine the significance of the risk of exposure to HI. Id. However, Shahvari does
not define what constitutes a significant risk and instead leaves that question for courts to answer.
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have been exposed to the virus. A better standard is this Note's modification
of Marriott's distinct event approach which requires plaintiffs to trace their fear
to a distinct event that would cause a reasonable person to fear that exposure to
HIV occurred." If the plaintiffs can allege a specific incident of potential
exposure to HIV, recovery should be allowed." Therefore, this Note's
proposed judicial approach focuses on the reasonableness of the plaintiffs' claims
that they were potentially exposed to HIV." 3
Proof of the actual channel of exposure is the greatest burden for plaintiffs
in HIV-fear cases,'" particularly in cases where it is impossible for the
plaintiff to prove actual exposure.'" Because of the impossible burden on
many plaintiffs, the court in K.A.C. v. Benson'" circumvented the rule and
held that proof of actual exposure does not require proof of direct contact with
Id. at 803-04.
161. See infra notes 234-41 and accompanying text.
162. See infra notes 242-43 and accompanying text.
163. Susan I. Zook, Note, Under What ircumstances Should Courts Allow Recovery for
Emotional Distress Based Upon the Fear of Contracting AIDS?, 43 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMIP.
L. 481 (1993); Johnsonv. West Virginia University Hospitals Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889 (w. Va. 1991)
(arguing that the reasonableness of the plaintiff's fear is based upon proof of exposure and the
statistical likelihood of contracting the disease). This argument fails to take into the account that the
recovery is sought regardless of whether the plaintiff ever develops HIV and therefore, a standard
based upon the statistical likelihood of contracting the disease defeats the purpose of claims based
on fear of exposure. See Goldberg, supra note 30, at 92 (quoting Chicago Torts professor Richard
Epstein, who states: "Cancerphobia plaintiffs have not been uniformly required to demonstrate a
probability of developing cancer, .. so why require it in AIDS phobia cases, especially given the
disease's high fatality rate?").
Instead of a standard based upon the statistical likelihood of contracting the disease, the
standard should be one based upon the likelihood that exposure potentially occurred. By focusing
upon the likelihood of contracting the disease, the courts would again ignore the reality of psychic
claims and would compensate only claims that have a high probability of resulting in physical illness.
However, regardless of whether the plaintiff develops HIV, the fear is the same during the period
in which a plaintiff does not know whether he or she will develop HIV. Instead, the focus should
be on whether the plaintiff has a legitimate claim for fear that potential exposure occurred. Zook's
standard is based on the probability of contracting the disease, and therefore requires the plaintiff
to prove the actual channel of exposure, for without actual proof, Zook sees the probability of
exposure as non-existent. See Zook, supra. The standard that should be employed is one that
measures whether there has been a substantial likelihood of exposure to HIV-infected blood or fluids.
Exposure does not necessarily guarantee development of the disease, and whether the plaintiff ever
actually develops the disease, the fear from potential exposure is equally harrowing. See infra
Section IV, notes 226-52 and accompanying text (presenting this note's modified distinct event
approach that focuses on the likelihood of exposure to HIV-infected blood or fluids).
164. Garves, supra note 32, at 27.
165. See, e.g., Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993); Rossi v. Almaraz, 1991 WL
166924 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1991) (holding that it was virtually impossible for the plaintiffs to prove the
actual channel of exposure, given that they were all unconscious during the surgery).
166. 1993 WL 515825, *2 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
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HIV-infected blood or bodily fluids." The K.A.C. court applied the proof
of exposure rule and held that the plaintiffs met the requisite showing of actual
exposure through their allegations that the HIV infected physician who was
suffering from oozing open sores on his arms, had placed his fingers, (either
singly or doubly gloved) inside the plaintiffs' body cavities.16s The court
reasoned that the physician's performance of invasive procedures while he
suffered from open sores was an exposure to HIV. " While the K.A. C. court
correctly abandoned proof of actual blood-to-blood contact, "o it did so by
expanding the exposure rule and holding that the defendant-physician's actions
constituted exposure to HIV.
Courts should abandon all forms of the exposure rule in favor of a judicial
approach that requires plaintiffs to trace their fear to an event that potentially
exposed them to HIV. " The form of the exposure rule is irrelevant."
The K.A. C. court's decision is a move in the right direction, but it does not
quite go far enough. Although it broadens the definition of exposure, it still
clings to the notion that plaintiffs must show actual exposure to recover. 17 4
The motive behind abandoning proof of actual exposure recognizes that the
requirement essentially punishes plaintiffs who lack the requisite information to
prove actual exposure.'" Regardless of whether they can prove the actual
channel of exposure, many plaintiffs can still prove the legitimacy of their fears
through other means, but the courts in K.A. C. and Marriott failed to consider
alternative means to test the legitimacy of the plaintiffs' claims. 76 As the
modified distinct event approach of this Note establishes, plaintiffs should be
167. Id. at *4. The court reasoned that proof of direct contact with HIV-infected blood was
a form of the physical impact rule, which was no longer applied in Minnesota. Id.
168. Id. at *4. The court reasoned that requiring the plaintiffs to show contact with the
physician's blood or bodily fluids would place 'an unduly difficult, if not insurmountable, burden
of proof on plaintiffs." Id.
169. Id. at 01. The court concluded that exposure may also occur when the object of danger
is "near or accessible to anything which may affect it detrimentally." Id. at 04.
170. K.A.C. v. Benson, 1993 WL 515825, 01 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
171. Id. at *2. The court stated that "Dr. Benson's performance of invasive procedures while
suffering from exudative dermatitis, regardless of whether he wore one or two pairs of gloves,
constituted an exposure to HIV." Id. Therefore, the court still required proof of actual exposure,
but held that proof of direct blood-to-blood exposure was not necessary to fulfill this proof
requirement. Id. at *3.
172. See infra notes 226-41 and accompanying text.
173. See infra notes 226-41 and accompanying text.
174. ICA.C., 1993 WL 515825 at 02-3.
175. Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 336 (Md. 1993). See also supra note 150 (presenting
cases which have held that proof of the actual channel of exposure is virtually impossible for
plaintiffs).
176. See supra notes 151-74 and accompanying text.
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required to link their proof to a distinct event that shows that a substantial
likelihood exists that exposure to BHIV-infected blood or fluids potentially
occurred at a specific point in time."
B. The Debate Over the Time Period of Allowable Recovery
If a court determines that the plaintiff can recover for emotional distress for
potential HIV exposure, the court then faces the challenge of determining the
time period of allowable recovery. The majority of courts that allow recovery
in HIV-fear cases follow the six month "window of anxiety" approach."
This approach defines the time period of allowable recovery as the six month
period between discovery of potential exposure and receipt of information that
indicates the plaintiff's freedom from infection with reasonable medical
certainty.' The window of anxiety approach is based on the acceptance of
medical research results that ninety-five percent of individuals who develop HIV
will test positive for HIV within six months of exposure."m The rationale is
that it is unjust to allow the plaintiff to recover for the fear of developing HIV
after they have had sufficient opportunity to determine with medical certainty
that they did not contract HIV. "'
Given that it may take several years before an individual manifests signs of
HIV infection, plaintiffs should be allowed to recover for their fear until they
know their HIV status with medical certainty."C For example, consider the
hypothetical case of a plaintiff who discovers two years after her kidney
transplant that the surgeon who performed the operation was HIV positive at the
time of her surgery. The plaintiff is tested for HIV and the results are negative.
Although the plaintiff brings her cause of action after the six month window of
anxiety period, she would still be able to recover for the time period in which
her HIV status is medically uncertain.
In 1991, the West Virginia Supreme Court allowed a plaintiff to recover
damages for emotional distress for the rest of his life, not just for the six month
177. See infra Section IV, notes 226-52 and accompanying text (proposing that instead of
proving the actual channel of exposure, plaintiffs should be required to trace their fear to a distinct
event that potentially exposed them to HIV). But see Maroulis, supra note 135, at 263; Zakarin,
supra note 135, at 273 (arguing that courts should uniformly require plaintiffs to present evidence
of the actual channel of exposure).
178. Goldberg, supra note 30, at 88.
179. Id.
180. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
181. Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 337 (Md. 1993).
182. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 3 [1995], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol29/iss3/5
1995] HIV-FEAR CASES 1285
window of anxiety period. 'I The rationale behind the extended recovery was
that, because of the controversy surrounding the HIV tests, a negative test result
may not sufficiently erase the plaintiff's fear of one day developing HIV. 1'1
Proponents of the extended recovery period are not confident in the majority of
medical researchers' six month window of anxiety period because of the
uncertainty that surrounds HIV and AIDS.' 8'
Extending recovery beyond the period of medical uncertainty about a
plaintiff's HIV status ignores the premise that plaintiffs should only be
compensated for the period in which they are uncertain about their HIV
status. Plaintiffs' recovery should be limited to the period of uncertainty
because their claims are based on their fear of the unknown. Allowing plaintiffs
to recover after the period of uncertainty compensates plaintiffs for a period in
which their fear is unreasonable. " Consequently, instead of allowing
recovery beyond the period of medical uncertainty, courts should only allow
recovery for the period in which plaintiffs do not know with medical certainty
whether they have contracted HIV. " However, a plaintiff's recovery may be
reduced or barred if the defendant can establish that the plaintiff contributed to
or assumed the risk of HIV exposure.' 8"
C. Questions of Assumption of the Risk and Comparative Negligence in
HIV-Fear Cases
As in other tort cases, in HIV-fear cases courts must address the issues of
contributory"g' or comparative negligence,' 9' assumption of the risk," and
183. See Johnaonv. West Virginia Univ. Hoops., 413 S.E.2d 889, 893 (W.Va. 1991) (holding
that the plaintiff could recover not just for the window of anxiety period, but for the rest of his life).
184. Goldberg, supra note 30, at 88.
185. See Popadopulos-Eleopulos,supra note 13 (discussing the skepticism surroundingthe tests
that are supposed to determine if an individual is infected with HIV).
186. Maroulis, supra note 135, at 228-59. The author argues that although the AIDS tests are
not always accurate, they still offer a strong probability of whether infection has occurred. Id. at
258. Therefore, recovery should not be allowed when a plaintiff tests negative for HIV after testing
becomes viable. Id. at 258-59.
187. Id. In addition, the author argues that emphasizing negative test results as strong
indicators that the plaintiff has not contracted HIV is harmonious with traditional emotional distress
policies that have denied recovery for damages that were not in close proximity to the tortious
conduct. Id. at 259.
188. See generally Zook, supra note 163, at 489-91; Lanin, supra note 135, at 84; Maroulis,
supra note 135, at 259-63 (arguing that recovery should be limited to the time period of medical
uncertainty about the plaintiff's HIV status).
189. See infra notes 190-217 and accompanying text.
190. Contributory negligence occurs when plaintiffs fail to exercise due care. PRoSSER, supra
note 70, at 427.
191. Under a comparative negligence standard, the plaintiff's recovery is reduced in proportion
to the plaintiff's fault. Id. at 443-44.
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the existence of a duty.'" An examination of how the courts address these
issues in suits for the sexual transmission of HIV predicts how the courts will
probably deal with them in HIV-fear suits. In claims for sexual transmission of
HIV, plaintiffs may argue that it is the defendant's duty to disclose HIV
infection to the plaintiff.'" In response to suits for the sexual transmission of
AIDS, defendants may raise a comparative negligence defense in which they
argue that the plaintiff impliedly assumed the risk of HIV infection by engaging
in sexual intercourse.' 9' If the defendant's argument is successful, all claims,
192. Assumption of the risk occurs when the plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily assumes future
risks inherent in a particular activity or situation. CoMPARATIVE NsouGEiOc MAuAL 14 (1993).
193. To recover in a negligence action, the plaintiff must establish that: (1) the defendant had
a legal duty toward the plaintiff, (2) the defendant breached that duty, (3) the defendant's breach of
duty was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, and (4) the plaintiff suffered damages as a
result of the injury. WILuAM L. PROSSER, uT AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTs 136 (8th ed.
1988).
194. Before HIV became a significant issue, there were court decisions involving other sexually
transmitted diseases that held defendants liable for their failure to warn sexual partners of their
infection. HERMANN & BURRIS, supra note 31, at 340. See, e.g., R.A.P. v. BJ.P., 428 N.W.2d
103, 107-08 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the defendant had a duty to warn his sexual partner
abouthis herpes infection); Maharamv. Maharam, 123 A.D.2d 165,169 (N.Y. App. 1986) (holding
that a husband had a duty to inform his wife about his genital herpes infection); Duke v. Housen,
589 P.2d 334, 340 (Wyo. 1979) (reversing the plaintiff's claim against her sex partner for infecting
her with gonorrhea due to the statute of limitations, but reasoning that 'one who negligently exposes
another to an infectious or contagious disease, which such other person thereby contracts, can be
held liable in damages").
See also Mussivand v. David, 544 N.E.2d 265,270 (Ohio 1989) (holding that individuals with
venereal diseases have a duty to use reasonable care to avoid infecting their sexual partners); Louis
A. Alexander, Note, Liability In Ton for the Sexual Transmission of Disease: Genital Herpes and
the Law, 70 CORNELL L. RIe. 101, 102 (1984) (arguing that a legally enforceable duty exists in
sexual relationships to protect against the transmission of genital herpes, and therefore, an infected
partner has an affirmative obligation to reveal the infection before engaging in sexual intercourse).
The same argument can be made in AIDS cases. Plaintiffs can argue that the same duty imposed
by courts in other sexually transmitted disease cases should be imposed in cases for sexual
transmission of HIV. See Julia A. Galgen, Case Note, Doe v. Johnson: Wrongfid Transmission of
HIV Based on Traditional Tort Concepts, 3 J. PHARM. & L. 209 (1994).
See supra note 21 (discussing two commentators who propose that the standard of duty
imposed in cases for the transmission of other sexually transmitted diseases should be applied to HIV
transmission cases). See also C.A.U. v. R.L., 438 N.W.2d 441, 444 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)
(holding that the defendant did not have a duty to warn the plaintiff because at the time of their
sexual encounter (1985), it was not known that HIV transmission could occur through heterosexual
sex). The court determined that the key in cases for transmission of the AIDS virus is whether it
is reasonable for the defendant to have constructive knowledge of the defendant's capability of
transmitting the AIDS virus. Id. The court reasoned that at the time in which the parties engaged
in sexual contact, the general societal notion was that AIDS could not be transmitted heterosexually.
Id. Therefore, it was unreasonable for the defendant to constructively know that he could transmit
the AIDS virus. Id.
195. See Doe v. Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382, 1386 (W. D. Mich. 1993) (involving a defendant
who argued that the plaintiff assumed the risk of a sexually transmitted disease by engaging in sex
with the defendant).
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including negligent infliction of emotional distress, are barred.'" Other
defendants may argue that it is the duty of the plaintiff to inquire as to whether
the defendant is infected with HIV.'"
Defendants also argue that if the plaintiff engages in sexual activity after
being warned by the defendant that the defendant has HIV, contributory
negligence should completely bar recovery'" or comparative negligence should
reduce recovery." In jurisdictions that recognize the affirmative defense of
assumption of the risk, the defendant must show that the plaintiff had knowledge
of the defendant's risk of infection, fully understood and appreciated the
consequences, and voluntarily engaged in the risky sexual activity.' Some
commentators find the sexual liability cases troubling because most adults now
know how to avoid contracting HIV and should take precautions instead of
196. Id. at 1386. The defendant argued that he did not have a legal duty toward the plaintiff
because he did not know that he was infected with HIV at the time of their sexual encounter. Id.
197. See, e.g., Doe, 817 F. Supp. at 1386; C.A.U. v. R.L., 438 N.W.2d 441, 444 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1989) (examining arguments by the defendants that the plaintiff had a duty to ask whether
the defendant could possibly be HIV positive).
198. Deane Kenworthy Corliss, Comment, AIDS-Liability for Negligent Sexual Transmission,
18 CUMB. L. REv. 691, 719-20 (1988) (arguing that all sexually active persons have a duty to
protect themselves from the risk of contracting HIV). However, the author also argues that because
of society's interest in ending the spread of HIV, it is reasonable for the courts to impose a duty
upon "at-risk sexually active individuals" to warn their partners. If the at-risk individuals fail to
warn, they should be held liable for damages. Id. at 721-22.
See also Linda K. Burdt & Robert S. Caldwell, Note, Mhe Real Fatal Auracdon: COvil and
Criminal Liability for the Sexual Transmission of AIDS, 37 DRAKE L. REV. 657, 679 (1987-88)
(arguing that the determination of contributory negligence should be based upon whether the plaintiff
asked the defendant if he or she had HIV/AIDS). The authors further argue that if the defendant
did not manifest any outward signs of HIV infection and the plaintiff had no knowledge that the
defendant engaged in high-risk activity, then the plaintiff does not have a duty to ask about the
defendant's sexual health. Id. at 679-80. But see Goldberg, supra note 30, at 90 (arguing that all
sexually active individuals have a responsibility to question their sexual partners about their sexual
health).
199. Burdt & Caidwell, supra note 198, at 680. See also Schoenstein, supra note 78, at 78-79
(arguing that comparative negligence should reduce the plaintiff's recovery in proportion to the
plaintiff's fault if any or all of the following are shown: (1) the plaintiff engaged in high risk
activity; (2) did not ask about the defendant's sexual health; and/or (3) did not use a condom). See
Elber, supra note 21, at 924-27 (arguing that when plaintiffs have knowledge that the defendant may
have HIV, the fact finder must decide whether the plaintiffs' actions contributed to their injury).
Elber further contends that defendants may argue contributory negligence if the plaintiff did not use
or insist upon the defendant's use of a condom. Id.
200. Corliss, supra note 198, at 719-20. The logic behind assumption of the risk in HIV
transmission cases is that no wrong is done to one who consents to the risks accompanying sexual
intercourse. Burdt & Caldwell, supra note 198, at 678. A plaintiff may expressly or impliedly
assume the risk of HIV infection. Id. If the defendant can show that the defendant warned the
plaintiff and the plaintiff fully appreciated the extent of the risk of transmission from engaging in
sexual activity with the dcfendant, the plaintiff wili be barred from recovery. Id.
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blaming the other participant."
Generally, assumption of the risk has not been a successful defense in
sexual disease cases because courts are reluctant to accept the idea that
individuals assume the risk of contracting sexual diseases whenever they enter
into a sexual relationship.' Part of this reluctance is attributed to a public
policy interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of society.' If
courts allow defendants to claim assumption of the risk, the courts may
effectively contribute to the spread of HIV by giving immunity to individuals
who pass the disease through sexual contact.' Instead of giving immunity
to those who negligently spread the disease, the court should impose liability on
them for their actions to deter similar behavior in others and effectively restrain
the spread of HIV.' The fact that assumption of the risk arguments have not
been successful in cases for the sexual transmission of herpes" has led many
commentators to conclude that this defense will not be particularly successful in
cases for actual or feared sexual transmission of HIV.'
201. Goldberg, supra note 30, at 90 (quoting Elizabeth Cooper, staff counsel for the ACLU's
AIDS Project). See also Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equaliy, and the Legal Control of Sexual
Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 777, 784 (1988) (arguing that all sex is consensual unless there is
inducement by physical force, economic pressure, or deception).
202. Papelian, supra note 21, at 662. See Christian v. Sheft, No. C574 (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Feb. 15, 1989), (holding that the plaintiff did not assume the risk of AIDS because the
plaintiff only knew the defendant was ill and did not know that the defendant had AIDS); Kathleen
K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that consent to sexual
intercourse is vitiated by a partner's fraudulent concealment of the risk of infection of venereal
disease (in this case, herpes)).
See Brigham, supra note 80, at 545-46 (arguing that the individual infected with HIV is in the
best position to warn potential sexual partners of the risks involved with their sexual activity).
However, Brigham also argues that because there is no guarantee that HIV-infected individuals will
be honest about their infection, the only solution is to impose a legal duty upon the HIV-infected
individuals to honestly disclose their infection to all potential sexual partners. Id. at 546.
203. Elber, supra note 21, at 928-30.
204. Id.
205. See Papelian, supra note 21, at 649 (arguing that holding individuals liable for negligent
transmission of HIV will dater negligent behavior); Schoenstein, supra note 78, at 79 (arguing that
the courts must impose a duty upon HIV-infected individuals to curb the spread of HIV).
206. See Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Berner v.
Caldwell, 543 So. 2d 686, 687 (1989) (rejecting the defendant's claims that the plaintiff assumed
the risk of contracting a venereal disease by engaging in a sexual relationship with the defendant).
207. Goldberg, supra note 30, at 90. Goldberg quotes Michael L. Closen of John Marshall
Law School who notes that assumption of the risk is unlikely to succeed in AIDS cases. Instead,
Closen believes, courts will more likely employ a comparative negligence standard. Id. See Burdt
& Caldwell, supra note 198, at 678-79 (arguing that it is illogical to assert that individuals assume
the risk of contracting H1V every time they engage in sexual intercourse because such an assertion
contradicts the purpose of various state statutes that were enacted to prohibit the transmission of
venereal diseases). Id. The purpose of these statutes is to protect the public from further spread
of venereal diseases. Id.
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The issues of duty, assumption of the risk, and comparative negligence also
raise questions as to what responsibilities exist for individuals who may be liable
for actual or feared non-sexual transmission of HIV." One clear proposition
is that individuals do not impliedly assume the risk of infection from health care
workers, for society insists that hospitals must take precautions to prevent the
spread of all diseases.' This recognition of responsibility on the part of
hospitals is important in both AIDS transmission and HIV-fear cases, because
it raises questions as to what steps hospitals must take to prevent HIV exposure
to both health care workers and patients.
Although the risk of exposure from health care worker to patient is
extremely low, the case of Kimberly Bergalis,2t0 who contracted HIV from her
208. See Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 810 F. Supp. 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding the
defendant liable for not providing a safe work environment for the plaintiff who was stuck by a
contaminated needle); Marriott v. Sedco Forex Int'l Resources, 827 F. Supp. 59 (D. Mass. 1993)
(holding that the defendants were liable for the plaintiffs' fear of HIV exposure that stemmed from
the defendant's negligence in inoculating the plaintiffs with a vaccine that subsequently tested
positive for HIV). See also Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 695, 696 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1991) where the defendant failed to properly dispose of used hypodermic needles and syringes
in a manner provided by statutory laws, regulations, and local ordinances and as a result of the
defendant's negligence, an employee was stuck by a contaminated needle. See also Howard v.
Alexandria Hosp., 429 S.E.2d 22, 24 (Va. 1993) (holding that the hospital was negligent in using
unsterilized instruments during the plaintiff's surgery). After surgery, the plaintiff's doctor informed
her that unsterilized instruments were used during her surgery and he feared that exposure to HIV
or other viruses occurred during the surgery. Id. As a result of this information, the plaintiff had
to undergo extremely painful antibiotic therapy and suffered severe anxiety of contracting HIV. Id.
209. Keyes, supra note 16, at 603.
210. Thomas E. Margolis, Commentary, Health Care Workers and AIDS-HIV Transmission
in the Health Care Environment, 13 1. LEGAL MED. 357 (1992). Kimberly Bergalis, who died in
1991 from AIPS, was the first documented patient to receive HIV from a health care worker (her
dentist). Bergalis' case sparked significant controversy over whether health care workers should be
required to undergo HIV testing and disclose their test results to their patients. See Marjorie H.
Lawyer, HIV and Dentistry, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 297, 297-98,307-19 (discussing the Bergalis case
and proposing a federal statute that balances the competing interests of HIV carriers and the public).
Out of the Bergalis controversy emerged almost unanimous agreement on one method of
controlling the spread of HIV in medical facilities. Margolis, supra, at 392. The method was the
"implementation and enforcement of strict infection control guidelines and universal precaution
standards." Id. at 387-88. The CDC proposed guidelines for the protection of patients from
transmission of HIV and recommended that all health care workers "should adhere to universal
precautions and . .. should refrain from performing exposure-prone procedures or seek counsel
from a review panel." Id. at 375. The CDC guidelines also suggested that if allowed by the review
panel to continue certain procedures, the health care workers should be required to inform patients
prior to the procedure because disclosure is vital when procedures will put the patient at risk of
exposure. Id. at 391.
While the CDC guidelines are primarily for the protection of patients, health care professionals
have lobbied for guidelines to prevent the infection of health care workers from HIV-infected
patients because by February of 1992, 47 health care workers had been infected with HIV by
patients. Id. at 383. Since the CDC's guidelines are only advisory, medical facilities do not have
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infected dentist, illustrates that it is a possibility.2 ' Therefore, it is not
surprising that HIV-fear claims against HIV-infected health care workers have
emerged.
212
Paramount in the HIV-fear cases is the fact that many times someone's
negligence causes the plaintiff's fear of HIV exposure.213 Therefore, the HIV-
fear cases are important because plaintiffs who have been the victims of
negligence deserve compensation. It is in society's interest to curb negligent
behavior and prevent the spread of HIV2 4 by encouraging responsible
to strictly enforce universal precautions or routinely train their health care workers in infection
control. Id. at 382-83, 391-94.
In March 1992, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration compulsory regulations
became effective and in part require employers to: "(1) develop a written infection control plan; (2)
provide appropriate personal protective equipment; (3) observe universal precautions; and (4) give
workers information and training on bloodborne infectious diseases within 90 days of hire and at
least annually thereafter." Id. at 383. The best way to prevent transmission is through
precautionary measures, but consensus is greatly needed as to what precautionary measures should
be enforced in health care facilities. The determination of what precautionary measures should be
taken by health care facilities is beyond the scope of this note.
211. Margolis, supra note 210, at 359. Margolis quotes medical authorities who state that there
is a possibility of HIV transmission during invasive, exposure-prone procedures. In addition, a
surgeon:
will cut a glove in approximately one out of every four cases and probably sustain a
significant skin cut in one out of every forty cases .... Assuming that the surgical
patient's risk is exceedingly low . . . the risk that one of [the surgeon's] patients will
contract HIV becomes more realistic the more operations he performs .... Patients,
of course, cannot expect a wholly risk-free environment in a hospital. But there does
come a point where the risk of a detrimental outcome becomes sufficiently real ....
Id. at 372.
See Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251, 1283 (NJ. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1991) (applying a 'no risk" standard and holding that an AIDS-infected surgeon could be
prohibited from performing invasive procedures). The court reasoned that "where the ultimate harm
is death, even the presence of a low risk of transmission justifies the adoption of a policy which
precludes invasive procedures when there is 'any' risk of transmission." Id. See also supra note
16 (discussing restrictions on health care workers); supra notes 192, 202-09 and accompanying text
(discussing the assumption of the risk doctrine).
212. See, e.g., Kerins v. Hartley, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Faya v. Almaraz,
620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993); Howard v. Alexandria Hosp., 429 S.E.2d 22 (Va. 1993); K.A.C. v.
Benson, 1993 WL 515825 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (bringing claims against HIV-infected health care
workers).
213. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
214. Consensus is greatly needed as to whether health care workers should be allowed to
perform invasive exposure-prone procedures. See supra notes 16-17. The current scientific
evidence and CDC guidelines indicate that if universal precautions are followed, risk of HIV
infection is only present when HIV-positive health care workers perform exposure-prone procedures.
R. Bradley Prewitt, Comment, The "Direct Threat" Approach to the HIV-Positive Health Care
Employee Under the ADA, 62 Miss. L.J. 719, 741 (1993). Prewitt argues that the job restructuring
solution proposed by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) is a just solution because
it 'employs an individual, objective assessment of each HIV-positive worker and his role in the
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behavior both by those who are HIV-positive and those who are not infected
with the disease.'"5 The imposition of a duty to prevent the negligent spread
of HIV is important because without it, the courts will effectively grant
immunity to defendants who negligently expose someone to HIV . 2 6  At the
same time, all individuals have a responsibility to protect themselves against
HIV infection; consequently, it is important to determine whether the plaintiffs
negligently contributed to or assumed the risk of their actual or feared HIV
exposure.21 7
D. The Impact of HIV-Fear Cases
Given that HIV-fear cases are highly emotional and controversial, they have
the potential to perpetuate hysteria. Critics worry that these cases will increase
discrimination against employees or potential employees known to be HIV-
positive. 218  By continuing to educate society that HIV is not casually
transmitted, 219 the risk of discrimination against HIV-positive individuals will
diminish.3 ° The model AIDS discrimination units which are successfully
workforce rather than a hasty, generalization-based analysis." Id. Therefore, all HIV-positive
employees will be individually evaluated to determine whether they pose a risk of H1V transmission
in their job. Id. at 741-42.
215. Margolis, supra note 210, at 394-96.
216. See supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text (establishing the premise that allowing the
defense of assumption of the risk in sexually transmitted HIV cases grants immunity to defendants
who transmit the disease). This premise can be argued in all HIV transmission cases because if
courts do not impose liability upon individuals who negligently expose others to HIV, they will
effectively condone such negligent behavior.
217. If individuals contribute to or assume the risk of their actual or feared HIV exposure, their
recovery should be barred or reduced under contributory negligence, comparative negligence, or
assumption of the risk. The affirmative defense employed will depend upon which defense is
recognized in the jurisdiction.
218. Goldberg, supra note 30, at 88.
219. See supra note 6 (discussing the various modes of HIV transmission).
220. Michele A. Zavos, Right to Work: Job Protctions for People with HIV, TRIAL, July
1993, at 41. The court can play a crucial role through these cases in preventing discrimination
against HIV-infected individuals who do not pose a direct threat of infection to others. Id. at 41-42.
See School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 274 (1987). The Arline Court
established four factors that are to be considered in determining whether someone with a
transmittable disease can safely perform a job: 1) the nature of the risk (how the disease is
transmitted); 2) the duration of the risk (ow long the carrier is infectious); 3) the severity of the
risk (the amount of potential harm to third parties); and 4) the probability that the disease will be
transmitted and will cause harm. Id. at 275. By employing these standards, courts can determine
whether individuals should be allowed to continue in their jobs or whether the risk they pose is
outweighed by concern for the safety of others. Id. See also supra notes 15-17 and accompanying
text.
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decreasing HIV/AIDS discrimination illustrate the power of education. "
Consequently, the HIV-fear cases can be viewed as useful tools to educate
the general public about HIV transmission. The courts are fearful of an
overflow of HIV-fear cases, but they can prevent fraudulent claims through
education about the facts and the science of HIV and refuse to entertain claims
based on misconceptions about HIV transmission.' Through legitimate
claims, the judiciary can inform society that it will not tolerate activity that
potentially contributes to the spread of HIV.' AIDS has already claimed two
hundred thousand lives,' and currently over one million individuals are
infected with HIV.' Therefore, society should use every available means,
including legal liability, to combat the further spread of HIV.
221. Schulman, supra note 18, at 1117. AIDS discrimination units in Los Angeles have
discovered that prejudices against HIV or AIDS-infected individuals can be dramatically reversed
with education about the medical facts of HIV and AIDS. Id. at 1133-34. The units have learned
that before the fight against HIV and AIDS discrimination will be truly successful, fears about AIDS
as a disease must be eradicated. Id. The AIDS education program established by the city of Los
Angeles requires education for city employees about preventing further spread of HIV and how to
ensure confidentiality in the workplace, prevent discrimination, and protect against liability. Id. at
1134.
The first step of the program is a series of special briefing sessions for elected officials and
department heads to insure that these leaders will be knowledgeable. Id. Task forces are then
created within each department to coordinate workplace education and to solve problems. Id. Every
department must accomplish three objectives: "educate its employees; review and revise all policies
and procedures in light of AIDS and medical and legal information; and adapt daily department
interactions with the community to further public education about AIDS." Id. The employees have
learned that it does not matter who has HIV and who does not, because if their job entails possible
exposure to HIV, their lawful and medically safe action should be the same in either case: use
gloves. Id. '[Glloves are a reasonable response to just that tiny theoretical possibility some have
urged as justification for more tyrannical measures against people with HIV. Everyone learns that
protection of an individual's rights and the public's health adds up to the same thing-reason and
fairness." Id.
222. Through education about HIV, the judiciary will more ably distinguish legitimate claims
from tenuous claims of potential HIV exposure, and will play a major role in preventing HIV-fear
cases from perpetuating AIDS hysteria. Goldberg, supra note 30, at 88. See Johnson v. West
Virginia Univ. Hosps., 413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1991) in which the court allowed the plaintiff to
recover after an inmate with AIDS bit the plaintiff on the arm. Goldberg states that almost every
medical authority asserts that AIDS is not transmitted by biting, yet the court allowed recovery.
Goldberg, supra note 30, at 88. The distinction for the Johnson court was the fact that the inmate
bit himself first, and had his own blood in his mouth when he bit the plaintiff, and therefore, the
court reasoned that there was blood-to-blood exposure. Even with the inmate's own blood in his
mouth, almost every medical authority would still assert that the AIDS virus cannot be transmitted
in this manner. Id.
223. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 9.
225. See supra note 9.
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IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION-THE DISTINCT EVENT APPROACH
Currently, the issue of toxic torts is the primary health fear for
Americans.' Regardless of whether it is classified as a toxic tort, HIV is
also terrifying, and those who legitimately fear that they have been exposed to
HIV deserve compensation for their emotional distress. As the scientific
community's knowledge of the human mind has continued to grow, the judiciary
has increasingly recognized claims for mental injuries.227 However, many
courts continue to establish limits on claims for emotional injuries in an effort
to prevent a flood of fraudulent claims. '
These outdated limitations on emotional distress claims are no longer
justified in the face of scientific advancements concerning the legitimacy of
mental injuries.' Also, the physical impact and physical manifestation rules
propose that only those claims alleging tangible physical injuries are worthy of
compensation.' Similar to the physical impact and physical manifestation
rules, the majority of courts' standard of proof of the actual channel of exposure
is unfair and places an impossible burden on plaintiffs' While courts
believe that these rules are the solution to preventing a flood of HIV-fear cases,
the courts' limitations actually do not prevent frivolous claims. 2 Instead, the
limitations create more inconsistent case law because the courts define the rules
differently. 23
The solution to the current lack of uniformity in HIV-fear cases is this
Note's proposed judicial approach which is a modification of the distinct event
approach developed in Marriott v. Sedco Forex Int'l Resources. I The
modified distinct event approach consists of a five prong analysis that the courts
should consider:
226. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 92-104 and accompanying text (discussing pure psychic claims for
emotional distress).
228. See supra notes 64-91, 95-97 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 92-104 and accompanying text.
230. Levit, supra note 63, at 136 (arguing that emotional injuries deserve compensationbecause
emotional distress claims protect individuals' privacy and emotional well-being interests). See also
supra notes 92-104 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 131-74 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 136-48.
233. See supra notes 86-88, 151-74 and accompanyingtext. But see Maroulis, supra note 135,
at 263. Maroulis argues that uniformity among the courts is not necessary because each jurisdiction
is free to decide whether it will apply the physical impact or the physical manifestation rule. Id.
By maintaining inconsistencies among the jurisdictions, the courts perpetuate divergent standards of
recovery and in many cases, deny recovery to plaintiffs who legitimately fear that they have been
exposed to HIV. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 151-63 and accompanying text.
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1) whether the plaintiff is legitimately suffering from a fear of exposure
to HIV;
2) if so, whether the plaintiff can trace his or her fear to a distinct event
of potential exposure;
3) if so, the burden shifts to the defendant who must prove that exposure
to HIV could not have occurred during that distinct event;
4) if the defendant is unable to prove that HIV exposure could not have
occurred, the court must then examine whether the plaintiff negligently
contributed to or assumed the risk of HIV exposure and whether;
5) the plaintiff's period of recovery is based upon the time period in
which the plaintiff did not know with medical certainty his or her HIV
status.
The modified distinct event approach is illustrated using the following fact
pattern. 235
While emptying waste baskets at an insurance company, a contaminated
needle stuck a cleaning woman.' The company administered HIV tests and
failed to properly dispose of used hypodermic needles and syringes in a manner
provided by state law, regulations, and local ordinances . 7 The cleaning
woman developed a fear that she had been exposed to HIV and consequently
sued the company. 8  Under this Note's modified distinct event approach, the
court must first consider whether the cleaning woman legitimately suffers from
emotional distress based upon a fear of exposure to HIV. In determining
whether the plaintiff's emotional distress is legitimate, the court should not apply
either the physical impact or physical manifestation rule. Uniformity is greatly
needed in HIV-fear cases, and both rules perpetuate inconsistent case law due
to different definitions of what constitutes a physical impact or
manifestation' Instead, the court should investigate whether the cleaning
woman's emotional distress is legitimate by examining whether a reasonable
person in the cleaning woman's situation would also suffer emotional
distress.' The court should also determine the legitimacy of the cleaning
woman's emotional distress by employing the various tests developed by
psychiatrists to evaluate the validity of an individual's emotional distress."'
235. The fact pattern is based upon the facts of Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 588
N.Y.S.2d 695 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991). See supra note 208.
236. Castro, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
237. Id. at 695-96.
238. Id. at 696.
239. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text (illustrating the inconsistent case law
perpetuated by the physical impact and physical manifestation rules).
240. See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text (discussing the various methods employed
by psychiatrists to determine the legitimacy of the plaintiff's emotional distress claim).
241. Id.
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If the court determines that the cleaning woman's emotional distress is
legitimate, the court should then address the question of the channel of exposure.
As with the physical injury rules, the court should abandon the actual channel
requirement in favor of another standard that is more uniform. Abandoning the
proof requirement of actual exposure is justified because the requirement
imposes an impossible burden on many plaintiffs.' Instead, the court should
require the cleaning woman to tie her fear to a distinct event that potentially
exposed her to HIV. Applying the distinct event approach, the cleaning woman
would trace her fear to the distinct event of the contaminated needle that stuck
her. Because the company was conducting blood tests and because contaminated
needles actually have the proven potential to transmit HIV,243 the cleaning
woman would fulfill her burden of proof that she was potentially exposed to
HIV. The burden then shifts to the company to prove that exposure to HIV did
not occur. The burden of persuasion in HIV-fear cases should be shared by
both plaintiffs and defendants because in most situations the defendant will have
greater knowledge as to whether exposure occurred. 2"
This burden shifting employs the logic of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquituru in which the chief evidence of the case is practically accessible to
the person charged with negligence, but is inaccessible to the injured
242. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 6 (discussing the various modes of HIV transmission).
244. For example, in a surgery situation where the plaintiff was unconscious, the plaintiff will
have a difficult time proving whether exposure to HIV actually occurred. See, e.g., Barrett v.
Danbury Hosp., 1994 WL 76394 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 3, 1994) (providing an example where
the defendants possessed greater knowledge as to whether potential HIV exposure occurred). In
Barreu, the plaintiff went to the defendant hospital's emergency room due to abdominal pain. Id.
at *1. A doctor instructed the plaintiff to sit upon a gurney during the examination. Id. During
the examination, the doctor suddenly realized that the plaintiff was sitting in blood and in an attempt
to locate the blood's source, the doctor performed a rectal examination. Id. The doctor performed
a second rectal examination and the plaintiff alleged that blood was introduced into the plaintiff's
rectum during both examinations. Id. The doctor failed to locate the source of the blood, but the
plaintiff examined the gurney and alleged that as he pressed upon it, blood seeped out. Id. At trial,
the hospital submitted an affidavit of the hospital's Risk Manager who stated that after inspecting
all of the emergency room records for treatment during the night that the plaintiff was in the
emergency room, none of the cases revealed a medical history of AIDS, HIV-infection, or AIDS-
related syndrome. Id. at *8. Thus, the defendant hospital had the capability to determine whether
the plaintiff had been placed at risk for potential exposure to HIV during the time he spent in the
emergency room and could present evidence that there was no risk. Id.
245. For Res Ipsa Loquitur to apply, the plaintiff must establish the following: 1) the incident
was one which ordinarily does not happen unless someone was negligent; 2) the instrument which
injured the plaintiff was under the exclusive control of the defendant; and 3) no indication exists in
the circumstances that the injury was the result of the plaintiff's own voluntary act of negligence.
Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687, 689 (Cal. 1944). If the plaintiff is able to establish the
foregoing elements, then the burden shifts to the defendant to meet the inference of negligence and
give an explanation of the defendant's conduct. Id. at 687, 689.
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person.' Res Ipsa Loquitur has always been applied to cases involving
physical injuries.' However, the rationale behind the doctrine is applicable
in HIV-fear cases, because in most cases the defendant will have greater access
to information of whether exposure to HIV potentially occurred. 24  If the
defendant is unable to prove that HIV exposure did not occur, then the plaintiff
recovers. In situations where multiple individuals were present at the time of
potential exposure,' 9 if it is unclear whether exposure to HIV occurred, all
of the individuals will be held liable as in typical Res Ipsa Loquitur cases.'
This burden shifting standard encourages those who were not responsible for the
potential exposure to reveal what happened in order to avoid liability.
Given that it was the insurance company who took the blood samples from
the prospective life insurance applicants, the company will know whether the
246. Id. at 687-89.
247. Id.
248. For example, perhaps the surgeon was cut and the blood did or could have come in contact
with the plaintiff's blood. See, e.g., Marriott v. Sedco Forex Int'l Resources, 827 F. Supp. 59, 63
(D. Mass. 1993) (addressing the situation where the defendants possessed knowledge that the vaccine
used on the plaintiffs subsequently tested positive for HIV); Howard v. Alexandria Hosp., 429
S.E.2d 22, 24 (Va. 1993) (addressing the situation where the hospital possessed better knowledge
of whether the instruments used during the plaintiff's surgery were unsterile).
249. For example, in a surgery situation the medical personnel are in a more advantageous
position to know what occurred during the surgery, given that the plaintiff was unconscious. The
medical personnel will be able to testify as to whether anything unusual happened during the surgery
and whether there was potentially any blood-to-blood exposure. Given the fact that many defendants
may not be very candid as to what occurred in the surgery, the other medical personnel who were
present in the surgery will also be called to testify as to what happened. If the court finds that the
other medical personnel are not candid either, then the court will hold all who were present during
the surgery liable for the plaintiff's fear of exposure. See infra note 250 (discussing Res Ipsa
Loquitur where everyone who was present was held liable for the plaintiff's injuries).
250. In medical Res Ipsa Loquitur cases, the courts hold all of the medical personnel liable if
a clear picture of what transpired is not presented by the defendant(s). See, e.g., Ybarra v.
Spangard, 154 P.2d 687, 690 (Cal. 1944) (holding that where a plaintiff receives unusual injuries
while unconscious during medical treatment, every defendant who had any control over the
plaintiff's body or instrumentalities may be called upon under Res Ipsa Loquitur to rebut an
inference of negligence by explaining their conduct); Graham v. Thompson, 854 S.W.2d 797, 799
(Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that in medical malpractice cases, Res Ipsa Loquitur relieves the
plaintiff of the burden of proving specific negligence and creates a rebuttable inference of general
negligence); Fiumefreddo v. McLean, 496 N.W.2d 226,230-32 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that
Res Ipsa Loquitur applied against two physicians in a medical malpractice action when it was not
known which physician was guilty of the negligent act because the physicians were in a better
position than the patient to know the cause of the negligence).
See also Whetstine v. Moravec, 291 N.W. 425, 435-36 (Iowa 1940); Lair v. Lancourt, 734
S.W.2d 247, 249-50 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Cremeens v. Kree Inst. of Electrolysis, 689 S.W.2d 839,
842 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Ross v. Double Shoals Cotton Mills, 52 S.E. 121, 123 (N.C. 1905)
(holding that under Res Ipsa Loquitur if it is unclear as to which defendant caused the plaintiff's
injury, all defendants will be held liable).
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needle was possibly tainted with HIV-infected blood.25' Under this Note's
modified distinct event approach, the company must prove that the needle was
not used on an HIV-positive individual, and if the company cannot do so, the
cleaning woman will recover.
After deciding whether the plaintiff's fear has been traced to a distinct event
and whether the defendant can explain whether exposure occurred, the next step
in the court's analysis is to determine whether the defendant has an affirmative
defense that will reduce or bar the plaintiff's recovery. The defendant's
argument will depend upon whether contributory negligence, comparative
negligence, assumption of the risk, or a combination of these are accepted in the
jurisdiction.
Applying this step to the cleaning woman's fact pattern, the company would
have to convince the court that the cleaning woman contributed to her injuries.
Given that the cleaning woman was routinely emptying the trash, it cannot be
held that she contributed to her injury from the needle stick.1 2 Because the
cleaning woman was not negligent, she will recover for her fear of HIV
exposure from the contaminated needle puncture unless the company can prove
that the needle was not used on an HIV-positive individual. Given that the
company conducts the HIV tests, it has greater access to information about
whether the needle was used on an HIV-positive individual, and therefore, it is
appropriate to place the burden of proof upon the company. Because the
cleaning woman's fear of exposure is legitimate and can be traced to a distinct
event that potentially exposed her to HIV, the burden shifts from her to the
company to prove that exposure did not occur. If the company is unable to do
so, the cleaning woman will recover.
The last step in the court's analysis is to determine the period of allowable
recovery. The courts should allow recovery for the period during which
plaintiffs do not know whether they are infected with lIV. The plaintiffs' suits
are based upon a fear of exposure, and recovery after it is medically certain that
they are not HIV-positive would compensate plaintiffs beyond the period in
which their fear of exposure is reasonable. Consequently, the courts should
allow recovery until the point that plaintiffs know with medical certainty whether
they are infected with HIV. While HIV-positive plaintiffs will have an
additional cause of action for actual transmission of HIV, plaintiffs who are
251. In the actual case, Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 695 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1991), the court never shifted the burden of proof to the defendant to prove that the needle was not
used on an HIV-infected individual. Id. at 697. Instead, the court held that the cleaning woman
could recover for her fear of HIV exposure because all contaminated needles are potentially infected
with HIV. Id. at 697-98.
252. Id. at 695.
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HIV-negative will only be able to recover for the time period in which they did
not know their HIV status. Therefore, in applying this step to the cleaning
woman's fact pattern, she will be able to recover for the period in which she did
not know whether she was infected with HIV.
This Note's modified distinct event approach embraces modern advance-
ments in medical science as to the legitimacy of mental injury claims, and
although it requires the abandonment of the channel of exposure, it establishes
other legitimate means of monitoring fraudulent claims. More importantly, this
Note's modified distinct event approach establishes uniformity, which is greatly
needed to end the current diverse approaches in HIV-fear cases.
V. CONCLUSION
Currently, a lack of uniformity exists on every issue related to HIV, except
the fact that it is a deadly virus which crosses economic, racial, and gender
boundaries. Uniformity is needed to end the uncertainty and foster an approach
to prevent further spread of HIV. Through uniformity in HIV-fear cases, courts
will inform society that they will not tolerate negligent behavior that potentially
exposes another to HIV. Uniformity in HLV-fear cases will be achieved through
this Note's modified distinct event approach which eliminates the arbitrary
physical impact, physical manifestation, and actual channel of exposure
standards that have perpetuated inconsistent case law. 3
Eliminating these standards will not open the courts to a flood of claims
based upon unreasonable fears of contracting HIV because the modified distinct
event approach imposes an alternative burden of proof on plaintiffs. In addition,
the modified distinct event approach allows defendants to prove that HIV
exposure could not have occurred, thus adding another test to determine whether
the plaintiffs fear is reasonable. Imposing unnecessary restrictions upon
plaintiffs in HIV-fear claims is not the best way to prevent fraudulent claims.
Education is the best cure for unreasonable fears of contracting HIV.'
Through education about HIV, the courts will be better able to recognize
legitimate claims, and by refusing to entertain claims where exposure to HIV
could not have occurred, the courts will in turn educate society about HIV.
Amy L. Hansen
253. See supra Section IV, notes 226-52 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 221.
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